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This paper constructs a corporate governance practices index (CGI) from a set of 
24 questions that can be objectively answered from publicly available 
information. The goal is to measure the overall quality of corporate governance 
practices of the largest possible number of firms. CGI levels have improved over 
time in Brazil, and an examination of CGI components demonstrates that 
Brazilian firms perform much better in disclosure than in other aspects of 
corporate governance. This paper finds very high concentration levels of voting 
rights leveraged by the widespread use of indirect control structures and non-
voting shares. The paper does not find evidence for either entrenchment or 
incentives in Brazil using ownership percentages, but evidence is found that the 
separation of control from cash flow rights destroys value. The CGI maintains a 
positive, significant, and robust relationship with corporate value. A worst-to-best 
improvement in the CGI in 2002 would lead to a 0.38 increase in Tobin’s q.  This 
represents a 95 percent increase in the stock value of a company with the average 
leverage and Tobin’s q ratios. Considering our lowest CGI coefficient, a one-
point increase in the CGI score would lead to a 6.8 percent increase in the stock 
price of the average firm in 2002.  No significant relationship is found between 
governance and the dividend payout. The results are placed in context by offering 
a comparative analysis with Chile.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Do better corporate governance practices lead to a lower cost of capital and a greater market 
valuation? This paper presents evidence that this is the case in Brazil, and that efforts by 
regulators, stock exchanges, multilateral organizations, and others to improve corporate 
governance practices do pay off. The paper also discusses why better corporate governance 
practices may not be a panacea for all firms. There are many ways to represent corporate 
governance. One of them is through the relationship between the concentration of cash flow 
rights (voting and non-voting shares) and control rights (voting shares), the so-called voting and 
cash flow rights separation (or wedge) of major shareholders. Cash flow and control rights, 
however, may be just part of the story. Good corporate governance practices may also be 
represented by indexes based on charter measures and company practices. These indices consider 
many different aspects of corporate governance and may gauge the quality of overall corporate 
governance practices better. This paper develops a corporate governance score, or index (CGI).  
The CGI includes information from a very representative sample of Brazilian public firms, and it 
consists of items that can be objectively assessed without the need for qualitative evaluations. 
The design of the score is intended to be objective; although response rates can be quite low, 
respondents may be able to provide valuable information. Another goal was to obtain the largest 
sample possible.  
This approach stands in contrast to qualitative surveys that evaluate corporate governance 
practices, which are becoming more common. For example, CLSA (Credit Lyonnais Securities 
Asia) uses a questionnaire that is filled out by its analysts and that involves qualitative 
evaluations on their part or on the part of respondents. Similarly, the Brazilian Institute of 
Corporate Governance (IBGC, in Portuguese) conducts bi-annual corporate governance surveys, 
but the sample is limited and may suffer from the usual survey biases and low response rates. 
Durnev and Kim (2003) and Patel, Balic, and Bwakira (2002) report on a transparency and 
disclosure index computed by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) using 98 “0 or 1” questions. Durnev 
and Kim (2003) consider the CLSA index partially subjective, while they define the S&P index 
as largely objective. Brown and Caylor (2004) build a governance score for US firms from the 
Institutional Shareholder Services database. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2004) use a corporate governance index built from provisions followed by the 
Investors Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Bauer, Günster and Otten  (2004) use the   6
Deminor ratings of about 300 items related to corporate governance practices for companies 
included in the FTSE Eurotop 300 index. Black, Jang and Kim (2003) use a subset of 38 
objective questions from a survey conducted by the Korean Stock Exchange, leaving out all 
subjective questions.   
Alternatively, some authors prefer to compute their own indexes. Barontini and Siciliano 
(2003) define a number of dummies representing the risk of expropriation that depend on the 
existence of a controlling shareholder, the share of voting rights of large outside shareholders, 
and the existence of either pyramids or non-voting shares. Their dummies are a reduced version 
of our index. What we do is also methodologically similar to what La Porta, López-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), henceforth LLSV, and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have 
done. Like Black, Jang and Kim (2003), this paper includes only features that can be objectively 
assessed without the need to interview or survey interested parties. This paper also provides a 
short time series of its index; obtaining such information retroactively is not an option with 
subjective surveys or the use of current website information.  
This paper further investigates the relationship of its corporate governance measures with 
corporate valuation and performance. More concentrated control (voting rights) may be 
associated with external shareholders’ expropriation and poor corporate governance practices. 
This is sometimes called managerial entrenchment. More concentrated cash flow rights may be 
associated with an alignment of controlling shareholders interests with those of external 
shareholders, possibly leading to better corporate governance practices. This is sometimes 
labeled managerial incentives. The separation between voting and cash flow rights is large in 
Latin America, and it is usually achieved with the combined use of indirect control structures and 
non-voting shares, allowing a reduced investment in the total capital of the company by 
controlling shareholders without the loss of control.  
Finally, Chilean corporate governance data from Lefort and Walker (2005) are used in a 
brief comparative analysis of the two markets. The objective of this section of the paper is to put 
the results in a regional context. Chile was chosen instead of Argentina or Mexico because of the 
differences between Chile and Brazil, because the Argentinean market is much smaller than 
those in the other large Latin American economies, and because comparable studies of Mexico   7
were not available.
1 Brazil represents a large Latin American economy, while Chile has had a 
more stable economy in the last 20 years despite being smaller. The two countries have the same 
legal origin, but they differ greatly in investor protection.  LLSV (1998) created an “anti-director 
rights” index to measure the degree of shareholder protection in 49 countries, including Brazil 
and Chile. The index is the sum of six dummies that assume the value of 1 if a given form of 
shareholder protection is present. Brazil and Chile present very different levels of anti-director 
rights in the region. The value of the index is 2 for Brazil and 5 for Chile.
2 Argentina scored 4 
and Mexico 1 in LLSV (1998). This large difference was the motivation to select Chile in order 
to provide the paper with a Latin American context.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by presenting a case study of a French 
civil law developing country (Brazil), which is compared to another country (Chile) at a similar 
stage of development, and with similar law enforcement quality and legal origin, but with a 
different level of legal investor protection. For Brazil, very high concentration levels of voting 
rights are found, leveraged by the widespread use of indirect control structures and non-voting 
shares. In addition, control concentrated between 1998 and 2002, the period examined. It is  
shown that a worst-to-best improvement in the CGI in 2002 would lead to a 0.38 increase in 
Tobin’s q, which represents a 95 percent worst-to-best increase in the market value of equity for 
a company with the average leverage and Tobin’s q ratios. A one-point increase in the CGI 
would lead to a 6.8 percent increase in the stock price of the average firm; this result seems to be 
robust. On the other hand, no significant relationship is found between the dividend payout and 
the CGI, which suggests that the payout is endogenously determined. A scale factor appears to 
affect for the impact of corporate governance on value, with larger firms benefiting the most. In 
the comparative analysis with Chile, as there are no major differences in legal origin and   
judiciary quality, it is concluded that the key difference lies in investor protection, largely due to 
the almost exclusive use of voting shares by Chilean firms, while Brazilian law used to allow for 
                                            
1 At the end of 2002, the last year for which this paper’s governance scores were computed, Brazil’s market 
capitalization was $127 billion, Argentina’s was $17 billion, Chile’s was $50 billion, and Mexico’s $103 billion, 
according to the Worl3d Federation of Exchanges. End of 2003 GDP in US$ billion was $492 for Brazil; $626 for 
Mexico; $130 for Argentina; and $72 for Chile, according to the World Bank.  
2 The index is recalculated here because there was a misconception involving the “dual shares” dummy reported by 
LLSV (1998) for Brazil. The so-called Brazilian preferred shares are actually non-voting shares that do not possess 
the characteristics of preferred shares in the US; in addition, those shares usually make up more than 50 percent of 
outstanding shares in the market.   8
two-thirds of non-voting shares in the equity capital. This level has been reduced to 50 percent, 
however, for firms that went public after 2001.  
This paper offers a positive answer to the question of whether good corporate governance 
practices lead to a greater market valuation and a lower cost of capital in Brazil. The paper is 
divided into seven sections. The following section reviews some of the relevant literature on the 
association between corporate valuation and governance and presents the paper’s working 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data, the methodology for building a corporate governance 
practices index for Brazil, a review of the supporting literature for the index components, and a 
discussion of the evidence derived from applying the index questionnaire. Section 4 presents the 
empirical analysis, including the ownership concentration tabulations and the results for the 
relationship between corporate governance practices and value as well as initial robustness tests. 
Section 5 presents the endogeneity tests and additional robustness checks. Section 6 compares 
this paper’s findings with those reported elsewhere for Chile, and Section 7 concludes and 
presents policy implications.  
 
2. Brief Review of Literature and Working Hypothesis 
 
Recent studies suggest that the Berle and Means (1932) model of widely dispersed ownership is 
uncommon even in developed countries. Large shareholders control a significant number of 
firms in the wealthier countries as well. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), 
hereafter referred to as LLS, identified the ultimate owners of cash-flow and voting rights of 
firms in 27 developed countries. There are systematic differences among countries in the 
structure of laws and their enforcement, such as the historical origin of their laws. LLS find that 
relatively few firms are widely held, except in economies with very good shareholder protection;  
most firms are controlled by families or by the state. Controlling shareholders typically have 
control rights that considerably exceed their cash flow rights, mainly through the use of 
pyramids.  
Recent research highlights the importance of corporate governance in developed and 
emerging markets and suggests empirical relationships between governance and corporate 
performance. Results indicate that better corporate governance is associated with better 
performance and higher corporate valuation. LLSV (1998, 2000a, 2002) evaluate the influence 
of investor protection and ownership by the controlling shareholder on corporate valuation. They   9
conclude that better shareholder protection is associated with higher valuation of corporate assets 
and with more developed and valuable financial markets. When shareholder rights are better 
protected by the law, outside investors are willing to pay more for financial assets such as equity 
and debt.  
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) compute a corporate governance index for 1,500 US 
companies consisting of 24 anti-takeover provisions and shareholder’s rights compiled by the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) that can be objectively assessed. Each index 
item is a dummy variable, and the index is the simple sum of those variables. These authors find 
that better shareholder rights are associated with greater corporate valuation, and this association 
increases over time in the 1990s. The authors further find that pro-shareholder governance 
practices are positively related to profits and sales growth and negatively related to capital 
expenditures and the amount of acquisitions. Their results are confirmed by Brown and Caylor 
(2004), among others, who find that firms with better governance practices are worth more, 
perform better, are less risky and volatile, and pay out more dividends. Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2004) use a subset of six provisions from the 24 employed by Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) as an “entrenchment index” and conclude that entrenchment is negatively 
associated with firm value, while the remaining 18 provisions are not associated with firm value.  
Using a different sample and approach, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) traced back 
ultimate ownership and control of East Asian corporations. In particular, they examined the 
extent of deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule, the use of pyramiding and cross-holdings, 
the presence of single and multiple controlling owners, and the presence of controlling 
shareholders as top managers of the company. Their study showed that most East Asian firms are 
controlled by a single shareholder that often turns out to be a family. Pyramidal and cross-
holding structures are common. In contrast, the use of dual-class shares is very limited. The 
authors further documented a significant separation of ultimate ownership and control, which is 
most pronounced among family-controlled firms and smaller firms. In a similar study, Faccio 
and Lang (2002) analyzed ultimate ownership and control in Europe and reported that families 
are the most frequent type of controlling shareholders, and that there is a significant separation of 
ownership and control, mainly through the use of pyramids and cross-holdings.  
Claessens et al. (2002) separate the effects of control and cash flow ownership on the 
market valuation of firms in several East Asian countries and find that more concentrated control   10
adversely affects valuation, while cash flow ownership affects it positively. Wiwattanakantang 
(2001) investigates the effects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance in Thailand. 
Her results indicate that the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with better 
performance when assessed by accounting measures such as return on assets (ROA) and the 
sales-to-assets ratio. Since most firms in her sample do not implement mechanisms to separate 
voting from cash flow rights, controlling shareholders might be self-constrained and do not 
extract private benefits.  
The measures of corporate performance used in these and other studies include the ROA, 
the dividend payout, and proxies for Tobin’s q. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Black, 
Jang, and Kim (2003), and Klapper and Love (2004), among others, argue that there may be an 
endogeneity problem when performance measures are correlated with proxies for good 
governance practices, such as control and cash flow rights concentration or a governance 
practices index. Klapper and Love (2004) give the example of firms with good growth potential. 
To finance growth, insiders may decide in favor of costly better governance practices, which 
could please investors and lead to a rise in the firm’s Tobin’s q as well as a simultaneous 
improvement in their corporate governance practices index. Thus, at a given point in time, there 
could be a positive correlation between Tobin’s q and the governance practices index. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999, pp. 357-358) provide other examples. In standard cross-
section analysis, it is difficult to determine if there is causality between performance and 
governance practices or if they are simply being affected by unobserved heterogeneity, that is, 
firm-specific common factors that are not observed or measured by the analyst.  A more detailed 
discussion of how different authors have dealt with this problem is presented later in this paper.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 770) state that corporate governance in Italy must be much 
closer to the rest of the world than corporate governance in the US, Japan, or Germany. Barontini 
and Siciliano (2003) test if the risk of expropriation is associated with stock returns and Tobin’s 
q in a sample of public Italian firms between 1991 and 2000. The authors use dummies to 
represent the risk of expropriation, and their dummies are associated with the proportion of 
voting rights by the controlling shareholder and the stock ownership of large outside 
shareholders, as well with the presence of pyramids and non-voting shares. These researchers 
find no relationship between stock returns and the risk of expropriation and conclude that this is 
consistent with rational investors discounting stock prices in anticipation of expropriation, as   11
discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They also find that Tobin’s q is lower for companies 
that present a higher risk of expropriation, particularly if they are holding companies or are 
controlled by the state or families.  
Previous literature documents that there are both costs and benefits associated with 
ownership concentration. The presence of controlling shareholders may be harmful to the firm 
because their interests may not align with those of non-controlling shareholders (Shleifer and 
Visnhy, 1997; LLSV, 1998, 2000a, and 2002). However, the presence of controlling 
shareholders may not always be detrimental to the firm. Large shareholders may mitigate the free 
rider problem of monitoring a management team, and hence reduce agency costs. LLS (1999) 
argue that in countries where the law and its enforcement do not offer sufficient protection to 
outside investors, concentrated ownership can mitigate shareholder conflicts.  
In early literature that focused largely on shareholder-manager conflicts, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) have provided important early 
contributions for the understanding of the relationship between ownership structures and 
corporate valuation. Jensen and Meckling (1976) concluded that concentrated ownership is 
beneficial to corporate valuation because large investors are better at monitoring managers. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) distinguish between the negative control effects and the 
positive incentive effects of ownership concentration. They suggest that the absence of 
separation between ownership and control reduces conflicts of interest and increases 
shareholder’s value.  
Recent research (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; LLSV, 1998, 2000a, and 2002; and 
Claessens et al., 2002) suggests that greater cash flow rights are associated with greater valuation 
(the incentive effect). In contrast, concentration of control rights and the separation of voting 
rights from cash flow rights have a negative effect on firm value (the entrenchment effect). This 
latter literature focuses on the conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside 
shareholders. When large investors control a corporation, their policies may result in the 
expropriation of outside shareholders’ wealth. Such companies are not attractive to outside 
shareholders, and their shares may present lower market valuations.  
Dispersed ownership is rare in Brazil, and the inside-outside shareholder conflict is here 
considered the most relevant issue. Thus, the review of the impact of ownership and governance 
practices on value above leads to the following hypotheses:    12
 
H1: Higher concentration of voting rights among controlling shareholders is associated 
with lower corporate valuation and worse performance. 
H2: Higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders is associated with higher 
corporate valuation and better performance.  
H3: Higher separation of voting from cash flow rights by controlling shareholders is 
associated with lower corporate valuation and worse performance.  
H4: Better corporate governance practices are associated with higher corporate valuation 
and better performance.  
 
3. A Governance Practices Index for Brazil  
 
This paper presents an index based on information that can be objectively obtained from public 
sources, such as the mandatory filings with the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM, in 
Portuguese) and company annual and periodic reports. The index is structured according to 
manuals of best practices, particularly the Code of Best Practices of the Brazilian Institute of 
Corporate Governance (IBGC). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) code of best practices and the CVM code of best practices are used as well. These codes 
provide the framework to select the items to be measured in the index. It was decided to have a 
number of items that is neither too small to capture the multivariate nature of corporate 
governance, nor too large to render data gathering difficult, time-consuming, and costly.  
A set of 24 questions is developed. If the answer is “yes” to any given question, it is  
interpreted it as a pro-shareholder provision or action and assigned a value of 1. Negative 
answers are assigned a null value. The index is the simple sum of the values assigned to each 
question. Although the relative impact or importance of each question is not assessed, an 
unweighted index is easier to reproduce and less subjective than a weighted index. Indexes 
constructed in other studies have also followed this method, beginning with LLSV (1998) and 
proceeding with Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Black, Jang and Kim (2003), and Barontini 
and Siciliano (2003), among others. Klapper and Love (2004) use a similar method to adapt the 
CLSA index for their study. This paper will consider sub-indices as well as a partial index 
obtained with the deletion of questions that do not greatly differentiate companies.   
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) recognize that mechanisms to control agency problems, 
such as board composition and block shareholding, are interdependent. Correlations between any 
one of these mechanisms and performance may be spurious because they may be compensated 
for or offset by some other mechanism that is not considered. The method used in this paper does   13
not ignore this substitution effect, also described by John and Senbet (1998, p. 391), as the 
existence of alternative mechanisms is simultaneously and additively considered.   
Initially considered was including two questions that determined whether companies had 
level II or III ADRs listed in the United States or belonged to the São Paulo Stock Exchange’s 
(Bovespa) Novo Mercado (New Market) trading lists.
3 Those questions were omitted, however, 
because of their redundancy with many other questions that were retained, such as the use of 
international accounting standards. In any case, Doidge (2004) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 
(2004) provide evidence that foreign firms that list in the United States present, respectively, 
lower control premiums and greater value. The present analysis uses two separate control 
dummies for ADRs and the Novo Mercado.   
This section presents the data sources, the criteria for selecting index questions, and 
selected supporting literature for each item included, then discusses the empirical findings for the 
answers to each question.  
 
3.1 Data Sources 
 
The sample of public Brazilian firms is drawn from the universe of companies listed at Bovespa. 
The sample includes both financial and non-financial institutions and does not include companies 
with incomplete or unavailable information, with negative book value of assets, negative book 
value of common equity, and firms that did not trade. The final sample consists of firms that 
represent most of the market capitalization.
4  
The questionnaire is answered with information from the InfoInvest Database 
(www.infoinvest.com.br). This database is freely available except for the most recent filings, 
quarter and semi-annual filings, and a few other items; a subscription to the database provided 
                                            
3 Bovespa created two new trading lists for existing firms in December 2000 called Levels 1 and 2. It also calls 
“New Market” the trading list for companies that adhere essentially to its level 2 requirements and issue only voting 
shares when they first list. Level 1 requirements have to do with better disclosure and liquidity. Level 2 
requirements are much more demanding and include all Level 1 requirements plus accounting according to 
international standards, tag along rights, voting rights to non-voting shares in some cases, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, a unified one-year term to board members, and submission to an arbitrage court. In September 2004, 
Bovespa had 358 listed firms, of which only five were in the Level 2 trading list, 31 in the  Level 1 trading list, and 
only four in the Novo Mercado. Voluntary adherence to better governance and disclosure practices has been slow, 
although there is some precarious empirical evidence that such adherence may have a positive impact on corporate 
value (Carvalho Jr., 2003). See more details at www.bovespa.com.br.  
4 The average daily trading volume was US$272.7 million in 2003. The 10 largest market capitalization companies 
account for approximately 47 percent of market capitalization and 51.2 percent of trading volume. This paper’s 
sample of about 250 firms each year accounts for more than 90 percent of the market capitalization.    14
full access to all information. Data on Brazilian annual filings was obtained for 1998, 2000, and 
2002. Publicly companies are required to file information about the previous calendar year by the 
end of April of each year. These filings must supply, among other data, information about equity 
capital and ultimate ownership greater than 5 percent. The market and accounting information 
comes from the Economatica database (www.economatica.com), available by subscription, 
which contains time-series data on companies and company financial statements.   
 
3.2 Index Components 
 
Table 1 shows the questionnaire used. The criterion for including questions was whether they  
could be objectively answered through access to the Infoinvest database, CVM filings, company 
annual or periodic reports and websites. Many of the questions included in the CLSA index, for 
example, require analysts to make qualitative assessments or interview company officers and 
directors. This type of procedure was avoided in order to include the largest possible number of 
firms in the sample.
5 Of course, time and cost concerns were also an issue.  
Based on the IBGC’s Code of Best Practices, our 24 questions are grouped in Table 1 
according to four dimensions: disclosure; board composition and functioning; ethics and 
conflicts of interest; and shareholder’s rights. This organization turned out to be very similar to 
others in the literature, such as in Black, Jang and Kim (2003). These dimensions define the sub-
indices used in the tests in this paper but bear no influence on the weighing of individual 
questions in the index. The criteria and sources used to answer each question in are outlined in 
Table 1.  
A preliminary list of questions was submitted to a number of practitioner panels in both 
Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo that consisted of lawyers, controlling shareholders, 
representatives of IBGC, Bovespa, institutional investors, and CVM officers. These panels 
helped in refining the questions that were included in the final version of the questionnaire. Not 
all prescribed practices present in best practice codes or in listing requirements are fully 
supported by the empirical academic literature, free of contradiction or of measurement 
problems. In any case, it was decided to proceed with the questions listed in Table 1.  
                                            
5 For example, the latest IBGC survey started with a sample of 285 firms and about 1,500 questionnaires were 
mailed. Responses totaled 110 questionnaires, representing 70 firms.    15
The substitution effect described by John and Senbet (1998: 391) is the idea that different 
corporate governance mechanisms are not independent from each other. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) identify seven alternative, but not mutually exclusive, mechanisms of agency control: 
shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and outsiders; use of outside directors; debt policy; the 
labor market for executives; and the market for corporate control. When the internally defined 
mechanisms (insider shareholding, use of outside directors, debt policy, and reliance on the 
external labor market) are optimally set, there should be no effect on the value of corporations in 
a cross-section analysis. The index used in this paper accounts for two of these dimensions 
simultaneously (insider shareholding and the use of outside directors) and uses leverage as a 
control variable. In Brazil, there are no takeovers because control, as will be shown, is very 
concentrated and not really traded in stock exchanges, and the number of public firms per 
industry may be relatively small to implement a meaningful proxy for the labor market for 
executives in any specific industry.  
The remainder of this section provides a brief review of the literature associated with  
each of the four dimensions used for grouping questions. To keep the number of citations low, a 
limited number of survey papers are used and cited to support the inclusion of specific questions 
or sets of questions. Obviously, not all papers provide evidence in support of each question in 
itself but rather review the literature. Page numbers of supporting citations are provided in case 
the interested reader would like to consult other articles. Also presented is a brief discussion of 
findings for each of the dimensions in this section. The percentages of “yes” answers to each 
question in each year are reported only in the text, but not in the tables, for reasons of space. Full 




The first set of six questions in Table 1 is listed under the “Disclosure” dimension. This set of 
questions deals with related party transactions, company sanctions against governance 
malpractice, compensation disclosure, the auditors, and accounting practices.   
Greater disclosure in general leads to more value. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) and 
Carvalho (2003) present evidence about listing in the US and at Bovespa’s Novo Mercado, 
respectively. Firms that issue ADRs must meet a number of requirements that make them 
disclose more information and be more transparent. Klapper and Love (2004) find that an ADR   16
dummy is positively and significantly related to a governance index. Disclosing CEO pay is a 
good governance practice given the monitoring function of boards. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003: 16) state that firms with weaker governance structures tend to pay CEOs more. However, 
in time, CEOs may acquire more leverage over boards, particularly when they are very 
successful. Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 745) maintain that there is a weak, but positive 
relationship, between executive pay and performance.  
The selection of an auditor with a global reputation may convey better disclosure 
practices. For instance, Michaely and Shaw (1995) find that more prestigious auditors are 
associated with US IPOs that are less risky and that perform better in the long run. Coffee (2003) 
presents a thorough legal and economic discussion about the role of external auditors. Newman, 
Patterson, and Smith (2003) show that investment levels and outside shareholding are greater in 
countries where penalties for auditor failures and insider fund diversion are stiffer. Kolhbeck and 
Mayhew (2004) provide evidence that weak corporate governance practices are associated with 
more frequent related party transactions.  
The answers to the questions in the disclosure dimension reveal that most firms include 
factual information about related party transactions in their annual reports; in most cases they 
disclose related party transactions in a specific chapter of the explanatory notes.  Companies 
often disclose transactions and their value, but they do not provide many details. Additionally, 
most companies do not specify any sanctions in their charters against management for corporate 
governance malpractice. About 30 percent of companies use international accounting standards, 
and about 75 percent use one of the leading global auditing firms. Most companies disclose 
information about their CEO and directors’ compensation. However, because highly paid 
corporate officers see detailed disclosure of their compensation as a threat to their family and 
their own personal safety,  the disclosure usually reports on the types of compensation schemes 
used and on the total values paid to the chief officers and directors, without specifying individual 
amounts and compensation packages for each individual.  
 
Board Composition and Functioning 
 
Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2002, p. 95) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, p. 7) state that the 
empirical work in this area is partially based on practical and policy insights, rather than on 
theory-based hypothesis. The evidence regarding the link between board characteristics and   17
performance does not always support such relationship, particularly in the US and in the UK. For 
example, Weir and Laing (2001, p. 93) report that there is no direct effect of the governance 
structure on performance, with an exception for the use of board committees. Brown and Caylor 
(2004) find that the main board characteristics studied in the literature (independence, director 
compensation, and audit committees) do not explain performance in the US. In Brazil, Leal and 
Oliveira (2002) review board practices and report that most firms do not adhere to best practice 
recommendations and Da Silveira, Barros, and Famá (2003) find that the dual role of CEO and 
Chair of the Board reduces firm value. Becht, Bolton and Röell (2002, p. 96) present evidence 
that boards play a role in critical situations, while Klapper and Love (2004) include various 
board composition and functioning dummies in their study, which finds a positive relationship 
between governance practices and value. Black, Jang and Kim (2003) conclude that the 
proportion of outside directors is positively and significantly associated to corporate value in 
Korea.  
Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003) find, through experiments, that boards with outsider 
representation, even when they are not a majority, lead to the rejection of insider favored projects 
and the acceptance of institutionally preferred projects. A majority of outsiders improves their 
results. Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) find that the composition and the qualifications of 
board and committee members are associated with lower management compensation.  Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003, p. 17) believe that the composition of the board may not be important on a 
day-to-day basis but that it is instrumental for infrequent and crucial situations. They present 
evidence that board composition and size are important in CEO turnover, takeovers, and CEO 
compensation issues.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 751) argue that board effectiveness is a controversial issue 
and that boards may take too much time to act and be dominated by managers. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003, p. 17) believe that board size proxies for the board’s activity, explaining why 
smaller board sizes are better than larger boards that may be plagued with free rider and 
monitoring problems. The optimal board size is an open question, although the authors of this 
paper adhere to a size within the five to nine member recommendation of the IBGC. John and 
Senbet (1998, p. 386) report empirical evidence showing that the presence of monitoring 
committees (audit, nominations, and compensation committees) are positively related to factors 
associated with the benefits of monitoring. Klein (2002) shows that independent audit   18
committees reduce the likelihood of earnings management, improving transparency. Finally, the 
fiscal board is an optional device included in Brazilian corporate law. This device, which may 
resemble the U.S.-style audit committee, is formed by request of minority shareholders. 
However, the fiscal board “is formed to assure that minority shareholders’ rights are respected 
and their voice heard and it performs a superficial role in the supervision of the company’s 
financial reporting and control structure providing virtually no monitoring or understanding of 
the audit processes” (IBGC Newsletter, March/April, 2003).  
The board questions used in this paper reveal that in 36 percent of the cases in 2002 the 
chairman of the board and the CEO were the same person. Most companies do not use 
committees, and seventy percent of the boards are not clearly made up of a majority of outside 
directors. About 37 percent of the boards do not fit the IBGC’s recommended board size of five 
to nine members. In most boards, directors do not serve consecutive one-year terms, and most 
companies do not have a minority shareholder-mandated fiscal board.  
 
Ethics and Conflicts of Interest 
 
Eisenberg (1998) states “obedience to legal and ethical principles is consistent with 
maximization, even if greater gains could have been achieved by acting unlawfully or 
unethically, because law and ethics are channels through which maximization must flow.” In line 
with this statement, two questions were included about inquiries and convictions by the CVM. 
Also asked was whether the company submits to the faster and cheaper dispute resolution system 
of arbitration instead of the usual legal proceedings, which are very slow, expensive and offer 
countless opportunities for delays and appeals.  
The questionnaire further included three questions about concentration of control; the 
questions related to the conflict of interests between controlling and outside shareholders. There 
is a very large literature on conflicts of interest, and the introduction to this paper reviewed some 
of that literature and its main implications for this paper. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
find that in the US profitability first rises and then falls as the concentration of ownership 
increases. The rise is consistent with the incentive hypothesis, but after a point there is too much 
voting power concentration (entrenchment), which leads to the fall in corporate value due to a 
greater likelihood of expropriation. Claessens et al. (2002) find evidence for this relationship in 
Asia, while Lins (2003) finds stronger evidence for entrenchment than for incentives in 18   19
emerging markets. Leal, Carvalhal-da-Silva, and Valadares (2000) find some evidence for 
entrenchment in Brazil. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pp. 758-759) also review empirical evidence 
for the United States and believe that the ability of controlling shareholders to take advantage of 
minority shareholders is greater if they have superior voting rights, if the concentration of their 
voting rights is greater than the percentage of their cash flow rights, or if they use indirect control 
structures or non-voting shares. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pp. 754-755) also comment that 
monitoring by large minority shareholders is effective only in countries with good investor 
protection. In countries with poor investment protection, only majority ownership would be 
effective. Lins (2003) maintains that the presence of large non-managerial block holders 
mitigates the negative effect of control concentration on value, particularly in countries with poor 
legal protection.  
In the six questions under the “Ethics and Conflict of Interests” dimension of the index, 
most companies are not under investigation by the CVM and were not convicted by the CVM or 
the judiciary on charges of securities laws violations. This appears to be largely due to the low 
quality of law enforcement in Brazil and does not necessarily represent good behavior on the part 
of Brazilian companies. This is probably also the reason why most companies refuse to submit to 
arbitration courts. While arbitration decisions are quicker—and final—court decisions take a 
long time and offer many possibilities for appeals. According to stock exchange officers, 
controlling shareholders also believe that arbitration may be biased in favor of minority 
shareholders.  
In 75 percent of the companies, controlling shareholders own more than 50 percent of the 
voting shares, and the percentage of non-voting shares is greater than 20 percent in nearly 80 
percent of the firms. Consequently, in almost 90 percent of cases there is a control leverage with 
the proportion of voting shares relative to the proportion of total capital indirectly held by the 




Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 764) state that providing minority shareholders with the ability and 
incentives to vote for the board of directors, as well as ensuring minority shareholders’ ease in 
voiting, is a common governance arrangement to grant minority shareholders voice, because 
their investment is sunk in the firm. This also applies to inferior voting rights. When voting is   20
concentrated, it is easy for controlling shareholders to be heard and to monitor management. 
Consequently, a question is included about shared control and agreements among major 
shareholders, as shareholder agreements may be good or bad for minority shareholders. We 
specifically ask if the terms of existing agreements are beneficial to minority shareholders. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pp.748, 759) present evidence of private benefits of control that 
materialize in large control premiums. Nenova (2001) reports very high control premia for Brazil 
in a period in which tag-along rights have been removed from the law.
6 When these rights were 
reinstated, the control premium decreased. Questions are thus included questions about voting 
procedures, voting rights, and tag-along rights, beyond what was legally required. Becht, Bolton 
and Röell (2002, p. 35) find that indirect ownership structures, particularly when coupled with 
the presence of non-voting shares, may create strong incentives for expropriation of minority 
shareholders. For instance, Claessens et al. (2002), Lins (2003), and Leal, Carvalhal-da-Silva and 
Valadares (2000) find evidence that these structures are negatively related to value in Asian 
countries, emerging markets, and Brazil, respectively. One question about the presence of 
indirect control structures is thus included. Finally, Becht, Bolton and Röell (2002, p. 86) list 
evidence that liquidity is positively associated with firm value and negatively associated with 
ownership concentration. Thus included is a question on whether the “free float” is greater than 
25 percent, the minimum required in Bovespa’s level 1 trading list.  
The results for the shareholder rights dimension reveal that more than 90 percent of the 
companies do not facilitate voting by all shareholders beyond what is legally required and nearly 
90 percent of the companies do not grant any voting rights beyond what is legally required. Most 
companies do not grant better tag along rights than what is mandated in the law. All of these 
numbers decreased (improved) a little since 1998. Some indirect control structures actually dilute 
control instead of increasing it. This is the case in about 20 percent of the cases. However, most 
shareholder agreements do not reduce control concentration. About 30 percent of companies 
offer insufficient liquidity to shareholders.  
The following section discusses the overall characteristics of the data and of the CGI built 
from the questionnaire. The section also presents an initial analysis of the relationship between 
corporate governance practices, value, and performance.  
                                            
6 Tag-along rights basically relate to a minimum proportion of the price paid to controlling shareholders to be paid to 
minority voting shareholders in acquisitions.    21
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Ownership Measures  
 
Direct and indirect shareholding are analyzed. Direct shareholders are those who own shares in 
the public company itself. Considered here are all shareholders with 5 percent or more of  voting 
capital, as this is the threshold for mandatory identification of shareholders in Brazil. Indirect 
shareholding represents stockholders who ultimately own the company. This is determined by 
accounting for voting shares ownership (control rights) and for voting and non-voting shares 
ownership (cash flow rights). The ultimate percentage ownership is computed differently for 
cash flow and control rights. For example, if a shareholder has 51 percent of the total capital of 
company B that owns 80 percent of the total capital of company A, the shareholder ultimately 
owns 40.8 percent of the total capital of company A (51 percent times 80 percent). Assuming 
that all shares have the same voting rights, this shareholder controls 51 percent of company A 
(the minimum between 51 percent and 80 percent). The computation of ultimate control 
ownership uses the weakest link method commonly employed in the literature. The ultimate 
control ownership is the sum of an ultimate shareholder’s indirect control percentage, or 
percentages, when there is more than one control chain, with its direct control holdings, if any. 
This procedure is similar to the one used by LLS (1999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
(2000), among others. In addition, to calculate ultimate ownership percentages, both for control 
and cash flow rights, it is necessary to adjust them for the terms of existing shareholders’ 
agreements. The conditions in each agreement are considered to adjust the cash flow and voting 
rights percentages for the entire controlling block.  
This ownership analysis is possible because mandatory annual filings with the regulatory 
authority show the shareholding composition of parent companies when they exist, even if they 
are not public. Thus, we shareholding composition is analyzed backwards through public and 
non-public parent corporations until it is possible to classify the ultimate owners into one of the 
following groups: individuals, institutional investors (banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, foundations or investment funds), foreigners (either individuals or entities) and the 
government. This is done for the filings relative to 1998, 2000, and 2002.  
Results for ownership percentages in Brazil may be unusual when compared to other 
countries. The use of non-voting shares is rampant. The law still allows companies that went 
public before 2001 to have two-thirds of non-voting shares, while the current legal maximum is   22
50 percent for companies that went public after 2001. More than 90 percent of trading volume is 
in non-voting shares, while voting shares of a dual-class company trade very little, if they trade 
at all. Thus, it is not surprising that direct control ownership percentages are very high. There are 
very few companies that have only voting shares. Saito (2003) presents evidence that the price 
differential between voting and non-voting stocks is negative due to the low liquidity of voting 
stocks.  
Table 2 shows the ownership results. As expected, ownership is very concentrated. The 
largest shareholder has a median of 71 percent (50 percent) of the voting (cash-flow) rights in 
direct ownership and 68 percent (34 percent) of the voting (cash-flow) rights indirectly, 
indicating that the use of non-voting shares and indirect control structures leads to a large 
separation (wedge) of voting and cash flow rights with a median of 2 times. It is interesting to 
note that the very high median direct ownership of the largest controlling shareholder in Brazil 
seems to be much higher than those reported in the ownership examples in LLS (1999) and 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) and that the direct control percentage of the largest direct 
shareholder is larger than the control percentage of the larger ultimate shareholder. This happens 
in all but one of the ownership map examples displayed in Valadares (2002) and Valadares and 
Leal (2000) for 1996. As noted above, the inordinate use of non-voting shares in Brazil appears 
to explain this phenomenon.   
An example of an ownership structure that is more in line with the international evidence 
occurs when there is more than one control chain. Suppose company A is owned by companies B 
and C with 30 percent and 25 percent of voting rights, respectively. Company B is then owned 
by family F with 50 percent of the votes, and company C is also owned by family F with 60 
percent of the votes. In the chain from the family to B and on to A the family owns 30 percent of 
A. In the other chain the family owns 25 percent of A. Their ultimate ownership of A is 55 
percent. In Brazil, the most common type of ownership structure is one in which there already is 
a shareholder who directly controls more than 50 percent of votes. Then, departing from that 
large direct shareholder, ultimate shareholders own a smaller percentage of the firms higher up in 
the chain. Because the weakest link method is used (i.e., the smallest percentage in the chain is 
the control percentage of the ultimate shareholder), it is quite common to see indirect ultimate 
control ownership percentages that are less than direct control ownership percentages.    23
The point is illustrated by two ownership maps in Figure 1. In the first one, for CELPE 
(Companhia Energética de Pernambuco), an energy utility, there is one single direct controlling 
shareholder, the privately held company Guaraniana, with 94.94 percent of voting rights (V) and 
85.08 percent of the total capital (T). Indirectly, the largest shareholder is 521 Part, a holding 
company, with 20.85 percent of the votes. The research presented here does not aim to classify 
firms as widely held, and 50 percent is used as a cut-off to identify the nature of the ultimate 
controlling shareholders. This cut-off percentage is usually lower in other studies, such as 20 
percent in LLS (1999). This cut-off does not affect the ownership percentages presented here. 
The second example is Brasmotor. It is directly controlled by Whirlpool Brasil (55.08 percent) 
and Whirlpool Indústria & Comércio (4.92 percent). However, both are controlled by US 
Kitchenaid with 100 percent of the votes in both cases; Kitchenaid also owns 39.45 of Brasmotor 
directly. Thus, the ultimate controlling shareholder of Brasmotor is Kitchenaid with 99.45 
percent of the votes. The latter case is less common in Brazil and probably more common 
worldwide because the ultimate ownership control percentage is larger than the direct control 
percentage.  
When we consider the three largest shareholders, the cash flow rights concentration is 
larger than with the largest shareholder alone and the wedge is lower. This indicates that the 
other large shareholders hold more of the total capital and leverage less their voting rights than 
the largest shareholder, suggesting that there could be more conflicts of interest between the 
largest shareholder and other large shareholders than between the other large shareholders and 
the outside shareholders. If the Brazilian evidence is consistent with the international evidence, 
this wedge should be negatively related to value.  
Voting rights concentration has slightly increased in time. A more detailed analysis of 
ownership is presented in Valadares and Leal (2000) for 1996, Leal, Carvalhal da Silva and 
Valadaresi (2000) for 1998, and Carvalhal da Silva and Leal (2004) for 2002. The 1996 data 
used in Valadares and Leal (2000) was hand collected and is not available in the database used 
here; these authors neither adjusted for shareholders’ agreements nor included government- 
owned companies. 
Table 3 shows other ownership characteristics of our sample. Ultimate foreign ownership 
hovers between 25 percent and 29 percent. Ultimate government as well as institutional 
ownership stays between 8 percent  and 9 percent of the total number of firms. About 75 percent   24
of firms present an indirect control structure, and 20 percent of firms have agreements amongst 
their largest shareholders. Voting shares have typically represented a little less than 50 percent of 
the total number of shares, while free-floating shares outstanding are about 50 percent of total 
shares. These last two percentages must not be a coincidence. Most shares that trade in the stock 
exchange are non-voting shares anyway. About 90 percent of trading volume at the Bovespa 
Stock Exchange represented non-voting shares in the last few years.  
 
4.2 Value, CGI, and Control Variables 
 
Researchers have employed Tobin’s q to measure the discount in market values resulting from 
expropriation (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988, and LLSV (2002)). It is constructed as the 
market value of assets divided by the replacement cost of assets. DaDalt, Donaldson, and Gamer 
(2003) assert that Tobin’s original intent was to measure the firm’s propensity to invest. 
However, q has been used as a general measure of relative value of firms and its original intent is 
not inconsistent with our own purposes to measure the relative market valuation of firms.  
An estimate of the numerator of Tobin’s q is the book value of assets minus the book 
value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. The denominator is the book 
value of assets. Other forms of computing q are described in DaDalt, Donaldson and Lang   
(2003). These authors find that simpler computations of q should be preferred over more 
complex estimates, particularly when data availability is a concern, which is our case. In our 
robustness tests, we used the price-to-book (P/B), price-to-sales (P/S), and price-to-cash-flow 
(P/CF) ratios, as defined in the appendix, as alternate proxies for relative firm market value.  
To estimate Tobin’s q, we used the market value of equity computed by Economática. 
They use the market price of the most liquid stock (be it voting or non-voting) times the total 
number of shares (voting and non-voting). In Brazil, the most liquid shares are often the non-
voting shares. Voting shares are held by controlling shareholders and are rarely traded in the 
market. One may think that the equity market value we used may show a control discount as it 
largely reflects non-voting shares market prices. However, it is actually just the opposite. While 
there is a control premium in Brazil, these premiums are not strongly by daily market prices but 
show in private control transfer transactions that are not enacted in the stock exchange, as shown 
by Nenova (2001) and Valadares (2002). However, as Saito (2003) shows, the most liquid 
shares, the non-voting, usually trade at premium over the voting shares on a day-to-day basis in   25
the market. There is a liquidity discount applied on most voting shares in the Brazilian 
exchanges. Thus, our proxy for Tobin’s q and relative market value is not affected by a control 
discount. We also have no reason to believe that the use of book values to compute Tobin’s q is 
affected by inflation any more than in any other country; this proxy has been used because 
inflation rates in Brazil have been relatively low since 1995.  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of our variables. For brevity, we present the 
statistics computed for each firm-year. Thus, the observations for the same firm in 1998, 2000, 
and 2002 are considered as different observations. The median Tobin’s q is 0.87, the median P/B 
is 0.55, and the median dividend payout is 24 percent. Most Brazilian firms have traded below 
book value for a long time. The P/B ratio for the entire market has fluctuated between 0.5 and 
1.6 between 1993 and 2002, according to Standard and Poor’s (2003) for firms included in the 
S&P/IFCG Brazil index (70 or so, usually among the largest). Low liquidity, a series of 
economic crises, volatility, and very high real interest rates have kept stock prices depressed for 
a long time. Thus, Brazil’s Tobin’s q is also relatively low when compared to other emerging 
markets, and it offers the lowest ROA of 14 emerging markets studied by Klapper and Love 
(2004). All profitable Brazilian firms in a given year must pay at least 25 percent of tax-adjusted 
net income to shareholders, and most pay only pay this minimum. It is not surprising that the 
median dividend payout is 24 percent of unadjusted net income.  
The average CGI is 10 out of 24 possible points, ranging between 4 and 19. As we have 
seen before, there is a very high concentration of voting rights and the value of the median 
indirect wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights is 1.72 for the largest shareholder and 
1.54 for the five largest shareholders. We also highlight the median for some of our control 
variables: 59 percent for leverage; 15% for sales growth per year; and 10 percent for the ROA.  
The average for the ADR and the Novo Mercado dummies shows that 20 percent of the firms 
have ADR programs, while 14 are listed in Bovespa’s Novo Mercado.  
In Table 5 we show the progress of the CGI over time. The number of companies with a 
score above 16, the upper third of potential scores, went from zero in 1998 and 2000 to 3 in 
2002. All three are listed in the Novo Mercado. This shows that the score distribution is 
becoming slightly more skewed to the right, with a few outlying firms achieving better levels of 
corporate governance practices. This trend is slowly moving the sample to higher scores of 
corporate governance. Even though the median is constant at 10 points, both the minimum and   26
the maximum have gone up, as well as the first and the third quartiles, demonstrating that there 
was a modest general improvement in the corporate governance practices captured by our index. 
When we examine the sub-indices, we notice that Brazilian firms score better in disclosure, 
although they are below the S&P disclosure index average for emerging markets reported by 
Patel, Balic and Bwakira (2002). The number of firms in the upper third of the possible score for 
this sub-index is by far the largest. On the opposite end are shareholder rights. This sub-index 
shows the lowest number of firms in the upper third of the score range. The other two sub-
indices, “Board Practices” and “Ethics and Conflicts of Interest” have shown some improvement 
as well. These figures show that Brazilian firms may have a long way to go in terms of the 
quality of their corporate governance practices.
7  
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the relationship between the CGI and Tobin’s q and the CGI 
and firm size. Both figures suggest a positive relation between the CGI and these variables. In 
fact, firm size will be a variable that will particularly concern us in our ensuing analysis. Table 6 
shows the correlations between selected variables. The correlations between the indirect voting 
and cash flow rights holdings with the CGI are negative. Better governance practices are 
inversely associated with ownership concentration. Curiously, the correlation between the CGI 
and the wedge is positive, but very low. We would like at least some of the control variables to 
be strongly correlated with the governance variables and to be weakly correlated with Tobin’s q 
to be potential candidates for instrumental variables in our robustness checks. That seems to be 
the case from the correlation evidence. The GGI is negatively related to volatility and positively 
related to size. Actually, the two largest correlations in the table are those between size and the 
CGI (0.50) and between voting and non-voting shares concentrations (0.74).  
We use four control variables. We expect “Leverage” to be positively related to 
governance because better governed and more transparent firms may use more debt and debt 
may mitigate agency conflicts. In Brazil debt financing is very scarce and expensive because the 
federal government takes most of the savings available in the market. It is reasonable to expect 
that larger and more transparent firms are in a better position to use more debt than others. Table 
6 shows a positive correlation between “Leverage” and the CGI. We expect riskier firms to 
                                            
7 In a related paper, we used a reduced CGI with the 15 most discriminating questions computed for every year 
between 1998 and 2002. It shows the same trends we described above. There is a modest improvement in corporate 
governance practices, particularly with an increase in the number of firms with much better practices than most. See 
Carvalhal da Silva and Leal (2005) for details.    27
present poorer governance practices because greater risk may lead to more control concentration 
and greater expropriation of minority shareholders. We find a negative correlation between 
“volatility” and the CGI. Growing firms may find greater need for external finance and may 
benefit from improving their corporate governance practices. We find a positive but very low 
correlation between our proxy for growth and the CGI. We also used the ROA as a proxy for 
growth and profitability in some of our models and find a positive relationship between the ROA 
and the CGI.  
Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2003), and Black, Jang and Kim (2003) 
investigate if their control variables are determinants of corporate governance practices in order 
to control for endogeneity. They believe that if governance is determined by their control 
variables, then, when those are included in a model of performance as a function of governance 
and governance turns out to be significant, that would control for endogeneity. Klapper and Love 
(2004) dealt with the problem with control variables such as size, past growth, capital intensity, 
an ADR dummy, legal system effectiveness measures, and an interaction term between the legal 
system and the existence of ADRs. They also stated that unobserved country effects account for 
a large variation in firm level governance rankings. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) 
maintain that it is likely that unobserved factors may still affect both value and corporate 
governance practices, even if one uses an extensive list of control variables.  
Table 7 presents our OLS analysis for the relationship between our control variables and 
the corporate governance variables. We also included two dummies for listing in Bovespa’s 
Novo Mercado and for the existence of ADR programs. None of the variables maintains a 
consistent significant association with all corporate governance variables for every year. We find 
it very difficult that these variables are joint determinants of the CGI, and other governance 
variables, and corporate value. The ADR dummy is negatively and significantly related to the 
ultimate voting rights percentage for the largest shareholder in the three years analyzed. Only 
size is positively and significantly related to the CGI for the three years. The ADR and the Novo 
Mercado dummies are positively and significantly related to the CGI in 2002.  
We expect that the inclusion of size, at least, may help control for endogeneity. Actually, 
we will build an instrumental variable based on size in our robustness checks. We will maintain 
the other variables in our empirical models as well. We will return to the endogeneity problem in   28
our robustness checks section, but first we present our empirical exercises with a set of models 
with ownership data, the CGI, and control variables.  
 




We first analyzed value as a function of our ownership measures and the CGI. We run our 
regressions separately for each year, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Table 8 presents our results for 
Tobin’s q for 2002. The results for 1998 and 2000 are practically the same and we consequently 
omitted them. Model 1 includes only the CGI and the control variables. For a one-unit increase 
in the CGI, q goes up by 2.3 percent. This corresponds to an increase of 5.75 percent in the share 
value of a company with the sample average q and leverage. Volatility and ROA are positively 
related to q as well. Models 2, 3, and 4 omit the CGI and include the largest shareholder ultimate 
percentage of voting rights, cash flow rights, and the wedge, respectively. None is significant. 
Model 5 includes these three ownership variables together, with no significance as well. Models 
6, 7, and 8 include these three ownership variables and the CGI. Still, the CGI is significant and 
positively related to q. For a 1 unit CGI score change, q would increase between 2.7 percent and 
3.1 percent, depending on the model. Model 9 includes the ADR and Novo Mercado dummies 
with no tangible effect. Some of our control variables are significant and present the expected 
signs. Despite their significance, the CGI is always significant. For the range of coefficients in 
Table 8, the stock price would go up from 5.75 percent to 7.75 percent for each one-point 
increase in the CGI score. This is a statistically and economically significant result. We find 
support for the positive relationship of overall governance practices and value in this set of 
models. Our overall corporate governance practices measure includes ownership-related 
questions. We do not find, however, any evidence that indirect control and cash flow rights 
holdings by the largest shareholder influence value.  
Our index was then divided into four groups of six questions each. The groups 
represented disclosure practices; board functioning and composition; ethics and conflicts of 
interest; and shareholder rights. In Table 9 we reproduced Model 8 in Table 8 for 2002, using 
each of the four groups of the index separately;  our intention was to verify which sub-indices 
matter most.  Our findings show that the results are largely dominated by our disclosure sub-
index. This should come as no surprise. Firms scored higher in disclosure, and the scoring is   29
more discriminating among firms than the remaining portions of the index related to other 
aspects of corporate governance practices. While a one-point rise in the overall CGI has an 
impact of 2.73 percent on Tobin’s q, which is about the same magnitude for the corporate 
governance sub-indexes of the CGI, a one-point increase in the disclosure sub-index has an 
impact of 7.24 percent on Tobin’s q. In Brazil, the largest impact so far comes from disclosure, 
probably because the use of best practice corporate governance is still limited.  
It is possible that some of our disclosure questions are related to company size, 
particularly questions 4 and 5 that inquire about the auditors being one of the big 6 auditing 
companies and if the company uses international accounting standards. We computed the 
correlation of the answers for each question with our proxy for company size. We do not show 
the detailed results here but questions 4 and 5, as we suspected, presented the two largest 
correlation coefficients at 0.53 and 0.51, respectively. No other correlation coefficient was larger 
than 0.35 and most were close to zero. We proceeded to compute a reduced version of the CGI 
by excluding questions 4 and 5. The result is in Model 6 of Table 9. The CGI coefficient is of the 
same order of magnitude as in Model 8 in Table 8, however, the CGI coefficient is not 
significant anymore. Company size, as will be discussed further, is a factor in terms of the 
impact of good corporate governance practices. We also determined whether the removal of 
additional questions according to their correlation to company size would substantially affect our 
results. We excluded all questions with correlations above 0.25 (questions number 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 
12 and 20). The results obtained are essentially the same as with the removal of Questions 4 and 
5 only and are not reported.  
As yet another initial robustness check, we obtained the principal components from the 
set of 24 questions for each firm for 2002. We selected those principal components that showed 
an eigenvalue greater than 1 (10 components) and that explained 5 percent or more of the 
variance, resulting in six principal components. We then performed our analysis once again 
using these six principal components. The results are shown in Model 7 in Table 9. The appendix 
defines each one of the 6 principal components, provides their correlation with the original 
variables, and the rationale for their interpretation.  Principal components 1, 2, and 4 were 
positively related to Tobin’s q, but only components 1 and 4 were significant. Principal 
component 1 was named “one share one vote” and has to do with the use of non-voting shares to 
separate control from cash-flow rights. It shows the largest positive coefficient and the strongest   30
significance. Principal component 4 has the second largest positive coefficient and significance 
level and was named “disclosure supervision;” it has to do with use of international accounting 
standards, board size, and presence of a fiscal board. Principal component 2, named board 
independence, did not show a significant relationship with Tobin’s q.  
The three remaining principal components show negative coefficients with Tobin’s q. 
Only principal component 3, named “Malpractices free”, which had to do with being free of 
corporate governance malpractices inquiries and convictions, was marginally significant at the 
10 percent level. Because the number of firms actually under inquiry or convicted by the 
authorities in the last 5 years is very small, it is possible that the negative sign may be interpreted 
as a “market judgment” for companies that have poor practices but that are not under any 
investigation. Principal components 5 (“shareholder rights enforcement”) and 6 (“related party 
transactions potential”) showed no significant relationship with Tobin’s q.  
Our principal component analysis showed that the largest coefficients had to do with the 
coincidence of controlling shareholders interests (control rights) with minority shareholders 
rights (cash flow rights) through their parsimonious use of non-voting shares and with the ability 
of minority shareholders to supervise disclosure. Of course, principal components are labeled 
according to the analyst’s subjective interpretation. Nevertheless, we believe that our principal 
component analysis favors our conclusion, up to this point, that good corporate governance 





In addition to the relationship between ownership and corporate valuation, recent literature also 
studies the effect of corporate governance on the dividend payout. LLSV (2000b) suggest that 
dividend policies may address agency problems between corporate insiders and outside 
shareholders. Firms in countries with better investor protection show higher dividend payouts 
than firms in poor investor protection countries. The agency perspective of dividends asserts that 
cash payments to shareholders may help reduce agency problems. Fluck (1998) and Myers 
(2002) present theoretical agency models of dividend behavior where managers pay dividends in 
order to avoid disciplining action by shareholders. Additionally, Jensen (1986) sees expected,   31
continuing dividend payments as a good use of cash, which might otherwise have been wasted in 
value-reducing projects.  
The presence of large shareholders with a large concentration of voting rights and a low 
concentration of cash-flow rights may be harmful to the firm because they can expropriate 
minority shareholders, by, for example, adopting low dividend payout strategies. On the other 
hand, when controlling shareholders have large stakes of cash-flow rights they have an incentive 
to pay a greater fraction of net income as dividends.  By the same token, it is reasonable to 
expect that firms with better governance practices may also show a higher dividend payout as a 
costly sign of those practices. Thus, the dividend payout, as suggested in the literature, may be 
another governance practice that is simultaneously determined with other governance practices 
considered in this paper. In our robustness tests, we will not assume that the dividend payout is 
caused by corporate governance practices and we will consider it simultaneously with value and 
governance practices. In this section, however, we will analyze it as a dependent variable.  
Table 10 presents our results for the dividend payout in 2002. For the sake of brevity, 
once again we omit the results for 1998 and 2000. The CGI is positively related to the dividend 
payout for all models in 1998 and 2000 but that is not the case in 2002. For all years and models 
the relationship between the CGI and the dividend payout is not significant. This is consistent 
with the findings of Black, Jang and Kim (2003) for Korea. We have included one new control 
variable, current assets over total assets, to account for liquidity. More liquid firms may pay 
more dividends. Many of our control variables are significantly and positively related to the 
dividend payout, such as liquidity as well as size and the ROA. Leverage is negatively and 
significantly related to the dividend payout. The larger shareholder percentage of ultimate 
control and cash flow rights present a significant and negative relationship with the dividend 
payout at the 10 percent and the 5 percent levels, respectively, when alone, indicating a larger 
payout when there is less control concentration and more separation of control rights from cash 
flow rights. We find no significant evidence that the dividend payout is influenced by the identity 
of the controlling shareholder.  When we consider the ownership variables jointly with the 
overall corporate governance practices we find no significant relationship between the dividend 
payout and these corporate governance variables. Because of the nature of the dividend payout, 
with a minimum mandatory payout of 25 percent of net income computed for tax purposes, and 
its potential use in mitigating conflicts of interest, it is quite possible that it is endogenously   32
determined and that it is not adequately represented by the models in Table 10. We also run 
regressions of the dividend payout on our corporate governance sub-indices and found no 
significance for any of them. This analysis is available upon request.  
In our computation of the dividend payout we did not consider stock repurchases because 
they differ greatly in Brazil from their U.S. equivalents. First of all, repurchases may generate 
capital gains, which are taxed at 20 percent, while dividends are not taxed. So, taking only 
taxation into consideration, stock repurchases do not maximize shareholders’ wealth, and extra 
dividends would be a better alternative. The motivations for stock repurchases may also be quite 
different. Possibly, they may be used for delisting or for the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. For instance, repurchases may be a way to pay controlling shareholders a dividend 
even when the company had no profits, or they may be a way to reduce the number of outside 
shareholders with the company’s cash, concentrating the equity position of controlling 
shareholders and facilitating a future sale of the company associated with an ongoing private 
move by the new controlling shareholders.
8  
The Brazilian corporate law granted tag-along rights to all minority voting shareholders 
when the intent of a repurchase was delisting or transfer of control. These rights have been 
deleted from the law in May 1997 in order to facilitate privatizations. Minority shareholders 
would have no right to sue to receive the same amount for their shares when control was 
transferred. Tag-along rights have only been reinstated in 2001, with the corporate law reform. In 
February 1999, CVM introduced new regulation to mandate more disclosure of stock 
repurchases due to abuses in these types of transactions, particularly with a motivation to take a 
company private. Many privatized companies and other companies acquired or controlled by 
foreigners went private to avoid the costs of keeping the company public and of greater 
transparency. The reader is reminded that during this period real interest rates have been very 
high and equity fundraising in the domestic capital market quite modest.  
Disclosure and data availability about repurchases is limited. Announcements are made to 
Bovespa, or to the CVM, depending on the period and type of repurchase but no announcement 
about the completion of the bid is made. There is no data readily available on the actual result of 
the bid. Procianoy and Moreira (2004) report that repurchase bids average about 7.1 percent of 
                                            
8 We thank Professor Jairo Procianoy for a discussion about share repurchases and their use to expropriate minority 
shareholders.    33
the stock outstanding from the announcement information published by the company. They also 
report that there are no wealth effects on the announcement day. Saito (2002) presents evidence 
that minority shareholders of firms that repurchased stocks experience a significantly lower 
market valuation when the separation of control rights and cash flow rights is greater, while we 
did not find any significance in our own findings in the same period for the overall sample of 
listed companies. Finally, the number of stock repurchase offers is not large anyway. Procianoy 
and Moreira (2004) analyzed offers from 48 companies in the 1997-1998 period, many with a 
motivation towards delisting, while Saito (2002) examined offers from 30 firms in the 1994-1999 
period. Data for the offers, particularly for the actual percentage of shares outstanding bought, 
are not readily available and would have to be hand collected. If our omission of repurchases 
introduces any bias, Saito’s (2002) findings suggest that it would be towards making our findings 
for the separation of control and cash flow rights significant, confirming our hypothesis.  
 
Individual Question Analysis and Concluding Remarks 
 
We close this section with an analysis of the impact of individual questions in the CGI on 
Tobin’s q and the dividend payout for each question alone and with all the other questions 
simultaneously. We include all control variables in the analysis. Each question admits only a 
zero or 1 answer and therefore provides a dummy variables for the specific subject addressed. 
We highlight that different governance practices are substitutes for each other and, therefore, 
they may behave differently when studied in isolation or together with other practices. Our 
results are summarized in Table 11. Five questions show individual significance at the 5 percent 
level for Tobin’s q. The two largest coefficients belong to disclosure questions. Question 1 
inquires about substantial disclosure of related party transactions and Question 5 about the use of 
leading global auditing firms. When we control for the remaining questions, only Question 5 
remains significant. Two questions about the board composition show individual significance: 
board independence and size. Only board size remains significant after controlling for the 
remaining questions. Da Silveira, Barros and Famá (2003) find a non-linear relationship between 
the square of the number of directors in the board with Tobin’s q, suggesting an optimal size for 
the board. Curiously, our dummy for the use of the recommended board size shows a negative 
impact on performance. Question 22, about using pyramids to decrease control concentration, is 
positively related to value. Our individual question analysis shows that disclosure and the use of   34
indirect control structures dominate the positive impact of corporate governance practices on 
Tobin’s q.  
Our analysis for the dividend payout shows less consistency. Two questions show 
significance individually but when we control for the remaining questions, three different 
questions show significance. The three questions showing significance when we control for the 
other questions address the existence of committees, with a positive sign, and board size and 
additional voting rights, with a negative sign. These opposite signs reveal an inconsistent impact 
of individual CGI components on the dividend payout. We have already stressed that the 
dividend payout may be endogenously determined as a potential corporate governance practice 
in itself. We will address this issue further when we perform our endogeneity checks.  
We conclude from all previous exercises that value seems to be determined by overall 
good corporate governance practices. Our results are significant statistically and economically 
but we still need to verify if they stand the endogeneity tests and additional robustness checks. 
Disclosure seems to be the kind of practice that has the greatest impact in Brazil so far. However, 
our factor analysis test revealed that limiting the use of non-voting shares and reducing the 
ability of controlling shareholders to take advantage of related party transactions are also related 
to value. Our findings for the dividend payout are mostly not significant and not consistent when 
the CGI is a dependent variable but suggest that dividends are larger when there is more control 
concentration. We now turn to our endogeneity checks and additional robustness checks.  
 
5. Extensions and Additional Robustness Checks 
 
In this section we discuss alternate empirical implementations and potential problems that may 
affect our results. We begin by checking if additional variables, such as a quadratic version of 
our ownership variables, are related to corporate value. We also check if the results change in the 
absence of outliers and experiment with other definitions of our firm value proxy. We proceed to 
verify if our results are affected by endogeneity through a panel data analysis and the use of a 
simultaneous equation system with a size dummy instrumental variable. We also use a reduced 
version of the CGI in which we drop the questions that present little variation among firms. We 
close discussing potential survivorship bias.  
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5.1 Alternative Implementations of the Multivariate Model 
 
We reproduced the analysis in Table 8 and in Table 9 with the squares of the voting and cash 
flow rights concentration variables plus the square of the wedge to control for a potential non-
linear relationship of ownership and Tobin’s q. Our results do not change with the inclusion of 
these variables, and they are not significant in all models except for the dividend payout in 1998. 
In Table 8 we show the coefficients with the quadratic variables in Model 9 and in 2002. We do 
not show this analysis for the remaining years and for the dividend payout.  
We considered the price-to-book ratio (P/B) as an alternative measure of relative firm 
value. We reproduced the analysis for model 8 in Table 8 as well as the analysis in Table 9 
replacing Tobin’s q with P/B. In Table 6 one can see that P/B is not correlated with the CGI and 
that it shows a 0.44 correlation with q. Possibly, the P/B ratio reflects other factors, such as risk, 
and may not be a very good proxy for relative firm value. In fact, Rodrigues and Leal (2003) 
show that low P/B (value) stocks are riskier than high P/B stocks in Brazil.  
Our analysis in Table 12 shows that the P/B ratio is not significantly related to the CGI 
and its sub-indices but the coefficient with the disclosure sub-index and with the CGI are 
positive. Interestingly, the P/B is significantly and positively related to the cash flow rights 
concentration and negatively but not significantly related to the voting rights concentration. It is 
also positively and marginally significantly related to principal component 1, which we named 
“one share one vote.” The P/B seems to be a proxy for risk as well, and it is negatively related to 
performance (ROA). If the P/B was our proxy of choice for relative value, our findings in Table 
8 would be weakened, but the hypothesized signs would be maintained.  
We also used the price-to-sales (P/S) and the price-to-cash-flow (P/CF) ratios as proxies 
for market value. We reproduced all the models in Table 8 for these variables. We do not show 
these results here, but they are available upon request. All CGI coefficients were positive but not 
significant. We also found positive coefficients for the principal components that showed 
positive and significant coefficients in our initial analysis. If these variables were our proxies of 
choice for relative value, our findings in Table 8 would be weakened, but the hypothesized signs 
would be maintained.  
We proceed to check for the effect of outliers. We regress Tobin’s q, the dividend payout 
ratio, and the price-to-book ratio on the CGI alone and a constant term and delete the 
observations whose studentized residual exceed ± 1.96, as has been done by Black, Jang and   36
Kim (2003). Table 13 shows that our main result for Tobin’s q does not qualitatively change 
although the coefficient and its significance drop. Seven outliers have been removed in the 
Tobin’s q analysis. An exam of the removed outliers did not reveal any particular patterns.  
 
5.2 Endogeneity Checks 
 
Claessens, Fan and Lang (2002: 2764) address the issue of reverse causality by dismissing it as 
very unlikely. They consider ownership changes and their impact on corporate value and believe 
that these changes are slow when compared to value changes. Our analysis in Table 2 supports 
this view. Ownership percentages increase very slightly in time, remaining very high. We really 
doubt that our results are affected by endogeneity in the case of the ownership concentration 
given its magnitude. The CGI is also very stable over time. In any case, we proceed to check for 
endogeneity.  
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) affirm that panel data in a firm fixed-effects 
model could deal with the presence of endogeneity despite the use of control variables. Their 
argument is put forward in a very simple way. If corporate governance practices, be they 
ownership concentration measures or the CGI, are described by a linear relationship such as in  
  t i i t i t i e u x G , 1 , 1 , + + = γ β   (1) 
where Gi,t are the governance practices of firm i  in time t; xi,t is a vector of observed control 
variables while ui represents time invariant unobserved factors. Because these factors are fixed 
firm effects, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) claim that using panel data analysis with 
fixed firm effects could identify if the relationship between corporate governance and firm value 
is endogenous. The firm value equation is represented by 
  t i i t i t i t i v u x G Q , 2 , 2 , , + + + = γ β α   (2) 
where Qi,t is the firm relative value, such as in Tobin’s q. However, the model represented in 
Table 8 takes the form of equation 3 in most empirical tests, including our own.  
  t i t i t i t i x a G a Q , , 2 , 1 , ε + + =   (3) 
This equation will only be a valid representation of the corporate governance practices 
and value relationship if the correlation between G and ε is zero, which happens only if the 
coefficients of the unobserved variables in equations 1 and 2 are null. Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999) maintain that this is very unlikely. They model unobserved firm heterogeneity by   37
assuming that the omitted firm effects are fixed in time and use the fixed firm effects panel data 
analysis to verify the behavior of their cross-section coefficients.  
We follow the same procedure and use a reduced version of our index, with 15 questions, 
including those that are more discriminating among firms, and perform a balanced panel data 
analysis for every year from 1998 to 2002. We include the same control variables. We find that 
the coefficients in the fixed firm effects model are no longer significant, although they remain 
positive. These results suggest that our findings in the cross section model may be endogenous. 
Our results are not reported here but are available in a companion paper (Carvalhal da Silva and 
Leal, 2005).  
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999, p. 378) believe that the endogeneity suggested by 
our panel data analysis imposes the need for more structure to identify the impact of corporate 
governance variables on firm value. They use size as an instrumental variable. Their proxies for 
size are non-linearly related to corporate governance practices but are not strongly related to firm 
value when their corporate governance variables are present. The same is true in our analysis. In 
Table 7, size is positively and significantly related to the CGI. In Table 8 size is not related to 
Tobin’s q when the CGI is included in the model. This is exactly the property we would expect 
from an instrumental variable. In our case, it should directly predict the CGI but only indirectly 
predict firm value, through the CGI.  
Black, Jang and Kim (2003) use a size dummy induced by a peculiar Korean regulation 
that requires certain governance practices only for firms larger than a pre-defined asset size. 
Even though Brazil does not have this type of regulation, in practice things work that way, as the 
correlation between size and the CGI suggests. We believe that there is a “scale factor” that 
renders adopting better corporate governance practices easier and more advantageous for larger 
firms. We remind the reader that both the credit and the capital markets in Brazil are very small 
relative to its GDP, and that the government absorbs most savings through treasury securities. 
External financing is expensive and scarce and largely available only to larger firms. An 
illustration of this scale factor is the cost of short-term credit. While the average interest rate for 
working capital loans with an average maturity of 305 days was 35 percent per year in July 2004, 
the rate for vendor credit was 21 percent, according to Brazilian Central Bank statistics. Vendor 
credit is a typical form of loan made to suppliers of very large Brazilian and multinational firms 
who guarantee these loans and are their ultimate debtors. Thus, our belief in the existence of this   38
scale factor. Another reason for this scale factor would be the large fixed costs to keep a 
company public and listed reported in the Brazilian literature (see Carvalho, 2000). We decided 
to use a size dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm is in the top size quartile and zero otherwise.  
We also experimented with other definitions for this size dummy.  
A system of simultaneous equations was estimated via 3SLS. Tobin’s q and dividend 
payout measures can be included in this specification, as well as our size dummy instrumental 
variable. The endogenous model can be represented using the circular notation of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) combined with the simultaneous equation notation used by Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996).   






i i j X c c
1
  (4) 
Equation 4 represents the kind of test performed in our Table 8 and by many others, such 
as Klapper and Love (2004), with c as a vector of governance practices measures, such as the 
CGI or ownership percentages, and X as a vector of control variables that are associated with 
governance practices as well. Such equations, one for each governance practice measure, may be 
included in a simultaneous equation system, as in Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), with the firm 
value or performance equation represented by equation 5. If the coefficients of c in equation 5, 
simultaneously determined, are still significant, this will be an indication that the net effect of 
alternate governance practices is significant over the value of the firm.  




i i i i i X c Q
1
  (5) 
The results of our simultaneous equations analysis are show in Table 14 for the year 2002 
alone. The results for the other years are essentially the same and available upon request. With 
the size dummy instrumental variable, the coefficient for the impact of the CGI on Tobin’s q is 
even larger than the one found in our multiple regression study. The coefficient of Tobin’s q in 
the CGI equation, however, is not significant. The size dummy behaves as expected. It helps 
predict the CGI, but it is not related to Tobin’s q in the presence of the CGI. We repeated the 
analysis for the dividend payout and confirmed what we have already suspected from our 
analysis in Table 10: the dividend payout is unrelated to the CGI and, quite possibly, should be 
considered as an additional corporate governance practice indicator, simultaneously determined 
with other items in the CGI.    39
We experimented with size dummies defined as 1 for firms in the top decile, top third, 
and top half of the sample. We also computed the correlations between all our size dummies and 
the ADR and the Novo Mercado (NM) dummies. Correlations are below 0.30 for the NM 
dummy and below 0.50 for the ADR dummy. Finally, we included the ADR, the NM, and an 
ADR*NM interaction in our simultaneous equations analysis with all size dummies. None of 
these variables was significant in any model. The results obtained with this new formulation are 
consistent with the previous ones presented in Table 8. It is worth noticing that the coefficients 
for the top decile, top quartile, and top third largest firms in the sample are lower with the 
inclusion of the dummies for ADR, NM, and their interaction at 0.0161, 0.0257, and 0.0250, 
respectively. The dummy for the top half largest firms in the sample does not work as an 
instrumental variable because q becomes significantly and negatively correlated with the CGI 
when we use it. Finally, we repeated the panel data analysis with the size dummies with no 
change in the results.  
As in Black, Jang and Kim (2003) for Korea, we conclude, after checking for 
endogeneity, that our evidence supports a causal relationship between corporate governance 
practices and  firm value. We also present evidence that this relationship is exogenous in the 
presence of a “scale factor,” represented by a size dummy that is robust to most definitions we 
used. The impact of an increase in the CGI is larger for larger firms.  
 
5.3 Discussion of Potential Biases  
 
The number of public corporations in Brazil has increased in the last 10 years. There were 844 
public corporations in January of 1995, and in April of 2004 there were 928. The maximum 
number in the period was 1,046 in January of 1998. Carvalho (2000) demonstrates that this rise 
in the number of public companies in 1998 was an illusion. He shows that many of the 
corporations created in this period were state-owned corporations and syndicates related to the 
privatization program, corporations that became public to issue ADRs, securitization and leasing 
companies, and corporations that issued less than US$1 million. He deletes these companies and 
shows that the number of public corporations in Brazil declines. However, after this combined 
privatization and ADR phase, and a subsequent decline in the number of pubic companies, the 
number of companies stabilized and increased. We do not believe that the dynamics of the 
number of public companies in Brazil introduces any biases into our results because in most   40
cases these companies were not listed or did not have any market liquidity that allowed for the 
computation of some of the variables we need in our research.  
The number of Bovespa listed firms has been decreasing in Brazil. It starts at 545 
companies and was at 364 in March of 2004. Carvalho (2000) reports that the costs of keeping 
the company listed and public are cited by 88 percent of the respondents surveyed as the main 
causes that prevent companies from becoming or remaining public. Among these costs, the 
largest burdens are publication costs, mandated overhead, external auditors, and the shareholder 
services department. The law makes public corporations publish their financial statements in 
major newspapers as well as in the official registry of the state or county where they are   
incorporated. Many of these official publications charge exorbitant prices, becoming a de facto 
tax on public companies levied by states and counties. Another reason for de-listing is 
acquisition by foreigners. Siffert Filho (1998) shows an increase in ownership by foreigners in 
Brazil. Our Table 3 shows a decline in foreign ownership of listed companies. Many companies 
that de-listed have been acquired by foreign investors that saw no advantage in incurring the 
costs of keeping the subsidiary public in Brazil. Given this combination of circumstances, we 
believe that the companies in our sample are survivors. Their governance practices are probably 
better than that of companies that de-listed or of companies that remained private. Therefore, our 
results are representative of currently listed companies in Brazil but most likely overstate the 
quality and importance of corporate governance practices for other public Brazilian companies 
that are not listed or that are listed and were not included in the sample.  
 
6. Comparative Analysis with Chile 
 
In this section we provide a brief comparative analysis with the results obtained by a similar 
study for Chile. Our intention is to put our findings in context in Latin America. While Chile has 
many similarities with Brazil, it also has some key important differences, namely, it is a smaller 
and more stable economy, and it may offer better shareholder protection. Other differences will 
emerge in the ensuing paragraphs.  
In the small sample of Brazilian and Chilean companies used by Klapper and Love 
(2004), relative market valuations of companies were low, while their CGI level was high, 
suggesting a weak relationship between market value and governance in these countries. 
However, our own findings in this article and those of Lefort and Walker (2005) suggest the   41
opposite for much larger samples. Patel, Balic and Bwakira (2002) report an average firm-level 
S&P transparency and disclosure score of 32 percent for Brazil and Chile in 2000, low when 
compared to an average of 43 percent for emerging Asian markets and to the 55 percent score of 
South Africa, the highest-ranking emerging market. They find that the S&P index is negatively 
correlated with large shareholdings and positively correlated with price-to-book in Brazil. They 
included 30 Brazilian firms and 19 Chilean firms.  
Klapper and Love (2004) have noted that there is a large variation in CLSA’s measure of 
governance practices quality within specific countries. However, Brazil and Chile present, 
respectively, the third highest and the highest within-country homogeneity in the firm-level 
governance index computed by CLSA. These authors also note that Brazil and Chile present low 
relative market valuations while showing relatively high firm level governance indicators. These 
results, nevertheless, should be taken with caution because the number of companies covered in 
that study in Brazil (24) and in Chile (13) is very small, including mostly companies that listed 
ADRs in the US and are, therefore, very similar in terms of their governance practices. Durnev 
and Kim (2003) included 30 Brazilian firms and 15 Chilean firms in their sample, with similar 
results. Our study advanced this research by verifying if better governance practices bring about 
benefits to a much larger sample of firms in Brazil. Lefort and Walker (2005) did the same for 
Chile. This brief comparative analysis with Chile uses findings from the latter authors and our 
own. We also use the World Bank’s Corporate Governance Country Assessment for Chile from 
2003.  
Brazil and Chile share the same legal origin and traditions, and that should bear no 
influence in our analysis. We assume that the quality of the legal system is the same in Chile and 
in Brazil. Klapper and Love (2004) report that the “Legality” index for both countries is about 
the same and that the “Judicial Efficiency” index for the two countries is not very far apart, being 
higher in Chile.
9 Similar ratings are reported by Durnev and Kim (2003). We also verified that 
the disclosure quality is about the same according to the S&P ratings. Our reading of the World 
Bank’s (2003) assessment led us to conclude the same.  
As in Brazil, cross-holdings are not allowed and indirect control structures are very 
common in Chile; however non-voting shares are unusual while they dominate the Brazilian 
                                            
9 The “Legality” index was computed by Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003). The “Judicial Efficiency” index 
was obtained from the International Country Risk Guide for 2000.    42
stock market. Chilean economic groups control 70 percent of listed companies and 90 percent of 
their assets while group affiliation and conglomerates are not important in Brazil. Control 
concentration is also very high in Chile but larger in Brazil. The five largest shareholders control 
57 percent indirectly in Chile and 89 percent on average in Brazil. Control concentration has 
been increasing in the two countries.  
Lefort and Walker (2005) used a 67-question questionnaire that, in part, needed to be 
answered by firm representatives to compute their corporate governance score. Their response 
ratio was 29 percent The companies that responded, however, tended to be larger, representing 
42 percent of Chilean market capitalization, and these may be the companies with the best 
corporate governance practices. This experience shows the problems with this methodology, 
which we tried to avoid. Lefort and Walker (2005) were well aware of that and broadened their 
response ratio by answering about one third of the questions themselves on the basis of public 
information, thus increasing their sample size to 106 companies and 76 percent of market 
capitalization. This also suggests that data availability is probably better in Brazil than in Chile, 
as our reading of the World Bank’s (2003) assessment also seemed to indicate.  
The overall non-weighted average company score in Chile was 58 percent, while ours 
was 42 percent of the maximum score value used in each country. Although the questionnaires 
used by Lefort and Walker (2004) and by ourselves are not directly comparable, it is possible 
that Chilean firms actually offer better protection to investors than Brazilian firms, as has been 
previously suggested elsewhere. As in Brazil, Chilean companies score higher in disclosure than 
in other areas of corporate governance practices. In terms of board functioning and composition, 
Chilean boards are also dominated by insiders and rarely use committees. In what Lefort and 
Walker (2005) classified as shareholders’ rights, Chilean companies scored well, at 60 percent,  
while Brazilian companies scored 33 percent on average. This is the most distinctive category 
between the two countries in the sub-groups that make up each questionnaire used. From the 
World Bank’s assessment of Chile (2003) we noticed that some practices seemed better in Chile 
while others did not. There was no clear superiority of Chilean practices, with the notable 
exception of the use of non-voting shares.  
Lefort and Walker (2000, 2005) find that firm affiliation to groups tends to decrease their 
value but this is mitigated when there is little separation between control and cash flow rights 
and when pension funds are present as minority shareholders. In our study, we found that   43
institutional investors ultimate control bears no impact on firm value. They find that the 
relationship between ownership and separation of control and cash flow rights is nonlinear, while 
we essentially found no significant relationship, even for quadratic versions of these variables. 
Probably, because ownership concentration is so much higher in Brazil, it does not discriminate 
firm value very well among firms.  
In Chile there is a minimum dividend payment of 30 percent instituted by law, similar to 
the minimum of 25 percent in Brazil. The payout ratios in 2002 are at 36 percent, close to the 31 
percent average in Brazil. Payout ratios are larger in firms affiliated with conglomerates and 
when pension funds are present as minority shareholders in Chile. Like us, Lefort and Walker  
found that payout ratios increase with the control and cash flow rights separation, up to an 
inflection point of 70 percent of voting rights in the case of Chile. This decrease in the payout for 
very high concentration values is consistent with our findings in Table 10. In our endogeneity 
checks we found no significant relationship between payout and corporate governance proxies in 
the presence of the CGI in Brazil, while they maintain a significant relationship with ownership 
variables in Chile, even when their CGI is absent. The Chilean authors find very little in terms of 
the impact of their CGI on corporate value.  
The Chilean results seem to confirm previous findings that investor protection is better in 
Chile than in Brazil even though the two countries are comparable in terms of the quality of their 
judiciary. The Chilean practice of “one share one vote” and other shareholder rights seem to be 
the key differences in governance practices between the two countries. In general, the findings in 
Lefort and Walker (2005) confirm the Brazilian findings that market values are higher when 
corporate governance practices are better and when controlling shareholders are less entrenched.  
They also point to an important policy recommendation: non-voting shares should be banned by 
regulators. In our opinion, they have been among the key factors that explain inadequate investor 
protection in Brazil.  
 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Do good corporate governance practices pay in Brazil? Our answer is yes. We built a corporate 
governance practices index from a set of 24 objective questions. Our intent was to stay clear of 
questionnaires that would need to be responded by analysts or company officers and directors. 
The response rates of those questionnaires may be quite low, the results may be biased to   44
represent companies with better governance practices, and they are costly to repeat on an annual 
basis. Besides, it would not be possible or reliable to have answers from previous periods. 
Finally, these types of questionnaires have already been used in the Brazilian Institute of 
Corporate Governance studies. Our goal was to produce a questionnaire that we could answer 
ourselves from publicly available data. This allowed us to build a short time series of our CGI for 
the 1998-2002 period. It also allowed us to have a very large sample of firms and provided us 
with an instrument that can be used in the next few years to gauge the evolution of corporate 
governance practices in Brazil.  
The answers to our questionnaire reveal that most companies do not specify any 
sanctions against management relating to corporate governance malpractice. They disclose 
related party transactions in explanatory notes but provide only overall information about chief 
officer and director’s compensation. About 30 percent of the companies use international 
accounting standards, and about 75 percent use one of the leading global auditing firms. Board 
practices are worse than those in the larger markets. The chairman of the board and the CEO 
were the same person in about one third of the companies. In most companies, boards do not use 
committees, are not made up of a majority of outside directors, directors do not serve 
consecutive one-year terms, and do not have a minority shareholder mandated fiscal board. 
About 37 percent of the boards do not fit the IBGC’s recommended board size. The number of 
companies under investigation or convicted by the securities authorities is very small, but this is 
not an indication of good corporate behavior and is almost certainly due to the low levels of law 
enforcement in Brazil. This is probably the reason for companies not to submit to arbitration 
courts as well. While arbitration decisions are quicker and final, court decisions take a long time 
and there are many possibilities for appeals. Most companies do not facilitate voting by all 
shareholders and do not grant any additional voting rights and tag-along rights beyond what is 
legally required. About 30 percent of the companies offer insufficient liquidity to its 
shareholders. Our overall corporate governance practices analysis shows a modest general 
improvement in firm practices captured by our index in the 1998-2002 period. We also show that 
Brazilian firms score much better in the disclosure dimension of our index than in the other 
dimensions of board practices; ethics and conflicts of interest; and shareholder rights.  
In our study of voting and cash flow rights, as expected, we found very high 
concentrations. The percentage of indirect control rights for the five largest shareholders has   45
increased from 1998 to 2002, approaching a median of 90 percent in 2002. There was an increase 
in the proportion of cash flow rights in the same period, reaching a median of 54 percent in 2002. 
Because 75 percent of the firms sampled have indirect control structures, entrenchment in Brazil 
is considerable. There is widespread use of non-voting shares as well. The Brazilian economy 
has been one of the riskiest among the large emerging markets and its stock market is very 
volatile. Greater risk favors greater concentration of control as well as the use of mechanisms to 
leverage it. Finally, we show that the separation between control and cash flow rights is more 
pronounced for the largest shareholder alone than when other large shareholders are considered.  
In our regression analysis, we used proxies for leverage, growth, risk, size, and 
profitability as well as other control variables. We first related these variables to our corporate 
governance practices variables. Most of them do not maintain any significant and consistent 
relationship with the CGI over the years. Only size is significant for every year. We included 
these variables in a set of models, having Tobin’s q as our proxy for firm value. We found that 
the CGI shows a positive and significant relationship with Tobin’s q. A one-point increase in the 
24-point CGI leads to a 2.3 percent to 3.1 percent increase in Tobin’s q, depending on the model 
used. A one-point increase in the CGI score leads to a 5.75 percent to 7.75 percent increase in the 
value of the company’s shares for this range of Tobin’s q increase for a company with the 
average sample q and leverage. A minimum to maximum increase in the CGI for 2002 leads to a 
95 percent increase in the share value of the average company. Good corporate governance 
practices may lead to a substantial increase in value and a reduction in the cost of capital of 
Brazilian firms. This result is robust to a number of different formulations and does not seem to 
be plagued by endogeneity after we control for it using a size dummy instrumental variable and 
3SLS simultaneous equations, which revealed that there is a scale factor, with the impact of 
better corporate governance practices being greater for larger firms in the upper size quartile.  
We also found that disclosure has a much larger impact on corporate value than other 
corporate governance practices, such as board composition and voting procedures. This last 
result may be due to the very low scoring of most firms in the questions pertaining to corporate 
governance practices in general, while their median disclosure score is much higher. Better 
disclosure practices were introduced in the mid-1970s with a new corporate law and have been 
perfected since then, while better corporate governance practices are a recent issue in Brazil, 
with very little being introduced in the new corporations law passed in 2001. Most new measures   46
have been included in pension funds’ regulation and private contracting, as in the Novo Mercado. 
In a principal component analysis we found that factors named “one share one vote” and 
“disclosure supervision” had a large impact on Tobin’s q, emphasizing the importance of 
aligning control and cash flow rights and of oversight.  
We did not find a significant relationship between our ownership concentration variables 
and value. In most models, ultimate voting rights percentages of the largest shareholder and the 
wedge are negatively related to Tobin’s q while the total capital percentages are positively 
related. However, these relationships have never shown strong significance except for one model 
in one year. We do not find evidence for entrenchment and incentives as measured by the 
concentration percentages of the largest shareholder.  However, as stated above, few firms abide 
to the “one share one vote” rule. Maybe one reason for this surprising result is the very high 
concentration percentages owned by the largest shareholders. We do not find any significant 
evidence that the dividend payout is caused by corporate governance practices, it should 
probably be included as one of the corporate governance practices determined simultaneously 
with other measures. Dividends seem to be greater when control is more concentrated.  
Investors in countries with poor legal protection, such as in Latin America, discount the 
prices of firms to compensate for expropriation. However, lower stock prices may not raise 
demand for stocks enough in these countries, keeping the supply of outside equity limited (see 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). It would be reasonable to assume that outside equity financing 
would increase if the risk of expropriation were reduced through better legal protection and 
better corporate governance practices. Our comparison with Chile revealed that this country 
scores better in investor protection because of shareholder rights, by and large due to their 
predominant use of non-voting shares, while the levels of disclosure and the quality of the 
judiciary in Chile are very similar to those in Brazil.  
One of the authors has been requested to comment on a recent statement by the Brazilian 
Association of Public Companies (ABRASCA) on good corporate governance practices. 
ABRASCA essentially represents controlling shareholders, given the ownership structure of 
Brazilian companies depicted here. The document from ABRASCA is mostly quite generic and 
bland; however, when they comment on the issuing of new shares, they use stronger words and 
state that companies should use whatever securities are legally allowed in Brazil without 
adopting  dogmatic (the emphasis is ours) positions regarding non-voting stocks. We are   47
obviously not surprised by this statement, coming from ABRASCA, but strongly disagree and 
take the kind of dogmatic view they try to avoid. Brazilian regulators have always been indulgent 
about non-voting shares and our market is dominated by them while showing very poor investor 
protection levels. We believe that it is time for bolder actions to inhibit their issuance. Our 
comparative analysis with Chile also suggests that this is the case.  
There are initiatives in Brazil and in other Latin American markets to improve corporate 
governance practices. One key policy question is whether they pay off. Our analysis indicates 
that they do. The very high concentration levels of voting rights and the widespread use of 
indirect control structures and non-voting shares may deter most firms from adopting better 
corporate governance practices in Brazil. However, a small number of companies have improved 
their practices and are benefiting from a lower cost of capital. In fact, the Brazilian primary stock 
market has experienced a renaissance in 2004, with many strong brand-name private companies 
(in the cosmetics, airline, logistics, energy, apparel, health care, insurance, and other industries) 
going public to list in the Novo Mercado. It is too early to say if this is a new trend, but it is 
nevertheless a good sign.  
According to Morck and Yeung (2004), dividends are taxed each time they are paid in the 
United States. So, in a chain of firms in a pyramid, dividends are taxed every time they are paid 
in the chain so that when they are paid to ultimate shareholders at the apex of the pyramid, they 
have been taxed many times, creating a disincentive for pyramids. The United States was also 
plagued with control pyramids but introduced this taxation system in the 1930s precisely to fight 
them. Legislation banning pyramids from utility companies was also introduced in the US at the 
same time. Both measures are interesting policy issues. In Brazil, as we have already discussed, 
dividends are not taxed at all. Therefore, dividends can be paid as many times as necessary, 
facilitating the transfer of earnings among firms in the same indirect control structure or group; 
this is an incentive for tunneling. Public utilities are regulated by independent agencies in Brazil. 
Given the nature of their business and their close to monopolistic situation in many cases, 
banning indirect control structures could be considered by the authorities in the different 
regulated public services industries, according to their characteristics and market competition. 
Morck and Yeung (2004) also suggest that increasing competition through globalization may 
undermine the value of political connections, reducing the attractiveness of control pyramids.    48
Obviously, policy makers should stimulate a greater number of firms to adopt better 
corporate governance practices. Our evidence of a scale factor shows that greater stimuli should 
be devised for smaller public and listed firms as well as for non-public family-controlled firms. 
Another general suggestion is to proceed, at least gradually, towards the elimination of non-
voting shares in Brazil. The recent corporate law change lowering the maximum amount of non-
voting shares issued and outstanding from 67 percent to 50 percent is a step in the right direction 
but a long way from the ideal. However, some measures, such as the initiative of the National 
Development Bank (BNDES) to reduce the cost of debt of firms that commit to adopting better 
governance practices, have been left aside since the Lula administration took office. Considering 
the size of its financing operations, estimated at US$ 20 billion in 2004, we believe that this bank 
is instrumental in improving corporate governance practices in Brazil, particularly because other 
sources of long-term financing are scarce and expensive. It should have an active role in 
promoting better corporate governance practices, and it should put its “points for governance” 
system in practice. Asset allocation regulatory limits for institutional investors, particularly 
pension funds, should motivate acquisitions only of new issues for listing in the Novo Mercado 
and provide higher ceilings for voting shares holdings. The continuous improvement of corporate 
governance practices depends on the permanent vigilance of the Securities Commission, whose 
resources and oversight have been insufficient, according to some of its own past chief 
commissioners, and on perfecting corporate laws and their enforcement. Lowering the costs 
firms incur to be more transparent and to adopt better corporate governance is another key line of 
action for policy makers, particularly to make it viable for smaller corporations to raise funds in 
the Brazilian capital markets. One of these measures could be to lower the “hidden taxes” of the 
very high publication costs in official state registrars. A substantial reduction in the cost of 
capital may be waiting for firms that improve their corporate governance practices and the recent 
movement of strong brand-name companies going public to list in the Novo Mercado is real 
evidence of that.    49
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Table 1.  Index Questions Applied to Brazilian Companies 
#  Question (Remarks about what was really done) 
Dimension: Disclosure 
1  Does the company’s annual report, website or publicly disclosure include 
information about potential conflicts of interest such as related party 
transactions? (We verified if the annual report contained a section on related 
party transactions) 
2  Does the company specify in its charter, annual reports or other means 
sanctions against management in the case of violations of its desired corporate 
governance practices? (We verified if the corporate charter included any 
sanctions) 
3  Does the company produce its legally required financial reports by the 
required date? (We verified if the company published its legally required 
reports up to April 30th of each year, which is the legal limit date) 
4  Does the company use an international accounting standard (IASB or US 
GAAP)? 
5  Does the company use one of the leading global auditing firms? (the leading 
companies considered were PWC, Coopers & Lybrand, Arthur Andersen,  
KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte, Touche & Tohmatsu) 
6  Does the company disclose in its website or annual report compensation 
information for the CEO and board members?  (We verified in the annual 
filings with the CVM, called IAN, if any compensation information was 
disclosed, even if not by individual executives)  
              Dimension: Board composition and functioning 
7  Are the Chairman of the Board and the CEO different persons? (We verified if 
the name of the chairman and of the CEO were the same in the annual CVM 
filings)  
8  Does the company have monitoring committees such as a compensation 
and/or nominations and/or audit committee? (We verified the existence of such 
committees in the corporate charter)  
9  Is the board clearly made up of outside and possibly independent directors? 
(We verified if directors were key executives in the company)  
10  Is the board size between 5 and 9 members, as recommended by the IBGC 
Code of Best Practices? (The size of the board was obtained from the annual 
filings with the CVM)  
11  Do board members serve consecutive one-year terms, as recommended by the 
IBGC Code of Best Practices? (We verified the term for directors in the 
corporate charter)  
12  Is there a permanent Fiscal Board? (we verified with the fiscal board was 
permanent according to the corporate charter)    56
        Table 1., continued 
#  Question (Remarks about what was really done) 
            Dimension: Ethics and Conflicts of Interest 
13  Is the company free of any undergoing inquiries at CVM regarding 
governance malpractices? (we verified if the company was listed among those 
being investigated in the CVM website)  
14  Is the company free of any CVM convictions and/or fining for governance 
malpractices or other securities law violations in the last five years? (we 
verified if the company was listed among those convicted or fined in the CVM 
website) 
15  Does the company submit to arbitration in place of regular legal procedures in 
the case of corporate governance malpractices? (We verified if the corporate 
charter privileges arbitration over regular legal proceedings)  
16  Do ultimate controlling shareholders, considering shareholder agreements, 
own less than 50% of the voting shares? (we computed this percentage from 
the annual filings with the CVM, we considered 50% as the threshold for 
control)  
17  Is the percentage of non-voting shares in total capital less than 20%? (We 
computed this information from the number of shares in the annual CVM 
filings)  
18  Is the ultimate controlling shareholders’ ratio of cash-flow rights to voting 
rights greater than 1? (we computed this information using the procedure 
described in this paper, with the threshold of 50% for control).  
                 Dimension: Shareholder rights 
19  Does the company charter or verifiable actions facilitate the process of voting 
to all shareholders beyond what is legally required? (we compared what is in 
the corporate charter, if anything, with the legal requirements at the time)  
20  Does the company charter grant additional voting rights beyond what is 
legally required? (we compared what is in the corporate charter, if anything, 
with the legal requirements at the time) 
21  Does the company grant tag along rights beyond what is legally required? (we 
compared what is in the corporate charter, if anything, with the legal 
requirements at the time – 80% for voting shares and no tag along for non-
voting shares) 
22  Are pyramid structures that decrease control concentration present? (we used 
the annual filings to verify if there were indirect control structures and if they 
reduce control concentration of the ultimate controlling shareholder)  
23  Do shareholder agreements that decrease control concentration exist? (we 
used the annual filings to verify if there were shareholder agreements and the 
terms of the agreements to check if they reduce control concentration of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder) 
24  Is the free-float greater than or equal to what is required in Bovespa’s Level I 
trading list (25%)? (we verified in the annual CVM filings if the declared free 
float was greater than 25%) 
 
Note: Each question corresponds to a “yes” or “no” answer. If the answer is “yes”, then the 
value of 1 is attributed to the question, otherwise the value is 0. The index is the sum of the 
points for each question. The maximum index value is 24. Index dimensions are simply for 
presentation purposes and there is no weighing among questions. All questions are answered 
from public information disclosed by listed companies and not by means of potentially 
subjective interviews. Sources of information are company filings, charters, and annual reports, 
for example, made available by Infoinvest.com.br.   57
 
Table 2. Direct and Indirect Shareholding Composition  
of Brazilian Companies 1998-2002 
        
 
   Direct Ownership  Ultimate Ownership 
Voting/ Voting/ 
Year N  Voting  Cash 
Flow  Cash 
Flow 
Voting  Cash 
Flow  Cash 
Flow 
Major shareholder 
1998  240 69  47 1.47 66  33 2.00 
2000  238 70  47 1.49 65  37 1.77 
2002  214 71  50 1.42 68  34 2.00 
Three largest shareholders 
1998  240 87  59 1.47 83  50 1.66 
2000  238 88  60 1.47 84  50 1.68 
2002  214 89  60 1.48 85  51 1.67 
         
Note: Median percentage direct and indirect shareholding concentration of Brazilian companies 
listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange. Such participation was analyzed backwards until the 
shareholder was identified to be from one of the following groups: (i) individuals or families; (ii) 
foreign investors (individuals or institutions); (iii) government; (iv) institutional investors 
(banks, insurance firms, pension funds or investment funds). The “voting/cash flow” ratio is the 




    Table 3. Ownership Characteristics of the 1998, 2000, and 2002 Samples 
Year  FOR  GOV  INST  PYR  AGR  VOTE  FREE 
1998 28.8% 8.8% 8.3% 75.4%  20.0%  47.3%  50.7% 
2000 28.4% 8.9% 8.5% 77.5%  19.5%  46.9%  50.3% 
2002 24.9% 8.0% 8.9% 75.2%  21.5%  46.3%  49.0% 
 
Note: Ultimate ownership by foreigners (FOR), institutions (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, 
foundations or investment funds) (INST), and the government (GOV) is represented after considering indirect 
control structures and shareholder agreements. The remaining balance is owned by families. The percentage of 
companies with indirect control structures (PYR) and shareholder agreements (AGR) is also presented. VOTE is 
the percentage of voting shares in the total capital. Free float is the percentage of shares outstanding, voting and 
non-voting, available for trading in the market (FREE). The information was compiled from company filings with 
the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM).  
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of All Variables 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  S.D.  Minimum  Maximum 
Performance Measures:          
Q 0.91  0.87  0.40  0.07  4.77 
Payout 31%  24%  47%  0%  460% 
P/B 0.95  0.55  2.14  -5.85  26.20 
P/S 1.25  0.37  5.03  0.00  62.72 
P/CF 5.72  1.75  47.17  -227.89  604.03 
Governance and Ownership Measures:       
CGI 10  10  2  4  19 
1VDIR 70%  70%  22%  9%  100% 
1TDIR 50%  48%  26%  3%  100% 
1V/TDIR 1.68  1.40  0.76  0.72  10.29 
3VDIR 83%  88%  18%  18%  100% 
3TDIR 61%  60%  25%  8%  100% 
3V/TDIR 1.58  1.34  0.70  0.83  10.29 
5VDIR 85%  90%  16%  18%  100% 
5TDIR 63%  64%  24%  9%  100% 
5V/TDIR 1.56  1.32  0.69  0.83  10.29 
1VIND 65%  66%  26%  6%  100% 
1TIND 41%  34%  27%  1%  100% 
1V/TIND 2.81  1.72  4.89  0.84  56.94 
3VIND 78%  84%  21%  18%  100% 
3TIND 51%  50%  26%  2%  100% 
3V/TIND 2.16  1.59  2.73  0.62  46.32 
5VIND 82%  88%  19%  18%  100% 
5TIND 55%  53%  26%  4%  100% 
5V/TIND 1.90  1.54  1.30  0.83  15.37 
FOR 0.28  0.00  0.45  0.00  1.00 
GOV 0.09  0.00  0.28  0.00  1.00 
INST 0.09  0.00  0.28  0.00  1.00 
PYR 0.76  1.00  0.43  0.00  1.00 
AGR 0.20  0.00  0.40  0.00  1.00 
ADR 0.20  0.00  0.40  0.00  1.00 
NM 0.14  0.00  0.35  0.00  1.00 
FREE 48%  50%  26%  0%  100% 
VOTE 55%  47%  23%  27%  100%   59
      Table 4., continued 
Variable  Mean  Median  S.D.  Minimum  Maximum 
Control Variables             
CA/TA 38%  36%  21%  0%  91% 
Growth 20%  15%  40%  -86%  778% 
Leverage 60%  59%  26%  1%  270% 
ROA 10%  10%  9%  -41%  38% 
Size 13.52  13.59  1.70  8.96  18.62 
Volatility 86%  70%  62%  10%  520% 
          
Note: The averages pool the values for all firm-years used, that is, the values for the same firm in 
1998, 2000, and 2002 are considered as three different observations. The definition of each variable 
is in the Appendix.   60
 
Table 5. Score Distribution for the Corporate Governance Index 
and for Four Sub-Indices for 1998, 2000, and 2002 
  
Year  Min  First Quad Med  Third 
Quad  Max  # in Upper 
Third Score 
CGI                   
1998 4  8  10  11  15 0 
2000 5  9  10  11  16 0 
2002 5  9  10  12  19 3 
Disclosure Sub-Index                
1998  1 3 4 4 5  43 
2000  0 3 4 4 6  50 
2002  1 3 4 5 6  55 
Board Practices Sub-Index             
1998  0 1 2 3 5  5 
2000  0 1 2 3 5  4 
2002  0 1 2 3 6  12 
Ethics and Conflicts of Interest Sub-Index          
1998  0 2 2 3 5  1 
2000  0 2 2 3 5  3 
2002  0 2 2 3 5  5 
Shareholder Rights Sub-Index             
1998  0 1 2 2 5  2 
2000  0 1 2 2 5  1 
2002  0 1 2 2 6  2 
 
Note: The statistics are: the minimum, first and third quartile, median, maximum, and number of
firms with score greater than the upper third score range (16 for the CGI and 4 for the sub-indices). 
The CGI score ranges between 0 and 24. Each sub-index score ranges from 0 to 6.   61
 
# Variable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Size
1 Q -.11 .44 .17 -.03 .03 .02 .17 .03 -.11 .09 .09 -.01 .13 .10
2 Payout -.02 .03 -.02 -.01 .00 .04 .00 -.06 -.17 -.06 -.07 .04 .05
3 P/B -.03 .04 .07 .00 -.02 -.01 -.02 .07 .24 -.02 -.12 -.03
4 CGI -.36 -.22 .11 .04 .12 .09 .13 -.22 .06 .19 .50
5 1VIND .74 -.10 .07 -.13 .07 -.04 .07 -.03 -.14 -.07
6 1TIND -.38 .25 -.04 .07 .00 .00 .01 -.05 .02
7 1V/TIND -.11 -.01 -.06 .05 .07 .05 .00 .02
8F O R -.19 -.19 .02 -.07 -.03 .26 .15
9I N S T -.09 .05 -.03 .00 -.01 .07
10 GOV -.01 -.07 -.03 -.06 .28
11 Leverage -.12 .04 .18 .20
12 Volatility -.03 -.28 -.31
13 Growth .00 .11
14 ROA .25
Note: The correlations are for the pooled values for all firm-years used, that is, the values for the same firm in 1998, 2000, and 2002 are considered as three 
different observations. A list of the variable definitions is in the Appendix.
Table 6. Correlations Among Selected Variables  62
 
Table 7. Control and Corporate Governance Variables 
  
  2002  2000  1998 
1VIND on  Coeff.  t  p  Coeff.  t  p  Coeff.  t  p 
Intercept  0.0541  0.2948 0.7685 0.2167  11,985 0.2320 0.4000  25,243 0.0123 
Volatility 0.0434  13,486  0.1789  -0.0151  -0.4182 0.6762 -0.0303 -10,452 0.2970 
Growth 0.0025  0.0753  0.9401  -0.0776 -13,749 0.1705 0.1042  16,498 0.1003 
ROA  -0.1088 -0.5234 0.6013 -0.0891 -0.4046 0.6862 -0.4372  -19,869 0.0481 
Size  0.0290  22,046 0.0286 0.0199  15,611 0.1199 0.0115  0.9852 0.3255 
Leverage -0.0053  -0.0776  0.9382 -0.0124 -0.1626 0.8710 -0.1639  -22,863 0.0231 
ADR  -0.1485  -29,652 0.0034 -0.1235  -25,102 0.0128 -0.1583  -31,057 0.0021 
NM  -0.0565  -0.9751  0.3307                   
Adj R2  0.0327        0.0110        0.0566       
F  20,302     0.0528  14,353     0.2020  33,890     0.0032 
1V/TIND on  Coeff.  t  p  Coeff.  t  p  Coeff.  t  p 
Intercept 0.9528  0.2866  0.7747  -34,046 -0.9718 0.3322 27,383  10,574 0.2914 
Volatility 0.4197  0.7192  0.4728  16,044  22,885 0.0230 0.1844  0.3886 0.6979 
Growth 0.4228  0.6916  0.4900  26,624  24,351 0.0157 -13,177 -12,763 0.2031 
ROA 14,508  0.3849  0.7007  -0.9546  -0.2236 0.8232 42,969  11,949 0.2334 
Size  0.0014  0.0058 0.9954 0.3191  12,927 0.1974 -0.1563 -0.8217 0.4121 
Leverage 12,552  10,157  0.3110 0.5191  0.3521 0.7251 31,154  26,589 0.0084 
ADR 0.9508  10,471  0.2963  -0.2210  -0.2317 0.8169 0.0228  0.0274 0.9782 
NM  0.5755  0.5476  0.5846                   
Adj R2  0.0198        0.0228        0.0199       
F  0.5938     0.7606  19,128     0.0797  18,105     0.0978 
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Table 7., continued 
    
  2002  2000  1998 
CGI on  Coeff.  t  p  Coeff.  t  p  Coeff.  t  p 
Intercept  34,090  23,429 0.0201 23,473  18,240 0.0694 14,960  13,545 0.1769 
Volatility -0.4714  -18,459  0.0663  -0.2565 -0.9959  0.3204 0.0048  0.0239 0.9810 
Growth 0.0223  0.0835  0.9336  0.4183  10,415 0.2987 -0.4118 -0.9353 0.3506 
ROA 13,926  0.8442  0.3995  0.3700  0.2360 0.8137 28,961  18,884 0.0602 
Size  0.4807  46,098 0.0000 0.5601  61,782 0.0000 0.5857  72,202 0.0000 
Leverage 0.3174  0.5868  0.5579  0.2673 0.4935  0.6221  0.6773 13,556  0.1766 
ADR  0.7716  19,417 0.0535 0.3071  0.8765 0.3817 0.5002  14,077 0.1606 
NM  14,673  31,899  0.0016                   
Adj R2  0.3198        0.2259        0.2351       
F  153,033     0.0000  124,265     0.0000  132,403     0.0000 
 
Note: OLS regressions of control variables and the indirect voting rights percentages of the largest shareholder; the wedge; and the CGI. The 
Novo Mercado (NM) dummy appears only in 2002 because this listing category did not exist in 2000 and 1998. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Significant coefficients up to the 10% level are shown in boldface.  
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Table 8. Results from OLS Regressions of Tobin’s q  
on Corporate Governance Measures for 2002 
 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Q 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
0.2185 0.1823  0.2080  0.2532  0.2320  0.1194 -0.0897 -0.1199  0.2213 
Constant 
(0.4007) (0.5024)  (0.4264) (0.3321) (0.3995) (0.6669) (0.7265)  (0.6533)  (0.5070)
0.0228* 
0.0311** 0.0265** 0.0273**  0.0254*
CGI 
(0.0837)              (0.0280) (0.0407) (0.0367)  (0.0635)
0.1040 -0.0569  0.0404  -0.0105  0.0071  -0.0324
1VIND 
   (0.3590)        (0.7467) (0.8225) (0.9493)  (0.9666)  (0.9609)
0.1558 0.2087  0.2013  0.2105  0.1891  -0.5667
1TIND 
      (0.1422)    (0.2402) (0.2526) (0.1925)  (0.2605)  (0.4213)
-0.0021 0.0020 0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0017  -0.0176
1V/TIND 
















*  Leverage 
                  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)
0.0343 0.0380  Dummy 
Foreigner                       (0.6281) (0.6111)
-0.0693 -0.0483 Dummy 
Government                       (0.5332) (0.6697)  65
    Table 8., continued 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Q 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
-0.0126 -0.0017 Dummy 
Institutional                       (0.9010) (0.9866)
0.0994 
Dummy ADR 
                        (0.1920)
0.0225 
Dummy NM 
                        (0.8045)








*  Volatility 
(0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)
-0.0702 -0.0688  -0.0704  -0.0688 -0.0719 -0.0713 -0.0529  -0.0534  -0.0417
Growth 
(0.1811) (0.1921)  (0.1805) (0.1928) (0.1747) (0.1740) (0.2719)  (0.2716)  (0.3967)
0.5865* 0.6376**  0.6249*  0.6100* 0.6125* 0.6115* 0.8004***  0.7346**  0.7495**
ROA 
(0.0686) (0.0500)  (0.0529) (0.0599) (0.0606) (0.0586) (0.0075)  (0.0178)  (0.0163)
0.0207  0.0362** 0.0348** 0.0364** 0.0340*  0.0136 0.0062 0.0086  -0.0059
Size 
(0.2950)  (0.0423) (0.0500) (0.0422) (0.0593) (0.4974) (0.7356) (0.6617)  (0.7896)
51,978 47,154  50,093  45,561  35,676 37,933 84,203  63,200  46,514 
F-statistic 
(0.0002) (0.0004)  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Adjusted R
2  0.0897 0.0802  0.0860  0.0770  0.0778 0.0950 0.2387  0.2306  0.2257 
         
Note: All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively; p-values in parenthesis.  
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Table 9. Results from OLS Regressions of Tobin’s q 
on Corporate Governance Sub-Indices for 2002 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
-0.0264 -0.0100  -0.1263  -0.0337  -0.1199  -0.1451  0.5175 
Constant 


























        




           
(0.0367) 
     
CGI   0.0210 
Reduced 
           






































-0.0891 -0.0733    0.0058  -0.08678  0.0071  -0.0134   0.1439 
1VIND 
(0.5871) (0.6586)  (0.9780)  (0.6003) (0.9666)  (0.9377) (0.4446) 
 0.2325   0.2060   0.1311   0.2458  0.1891   0.1889   0.0574 
1TIND 
(0.1680) (0.2245)  (0.5086)  (0.1592) (0.2605)  (0.2639) (0.7864) 
-0.0003 -0.0010  -0.0014  -0.0008  -0.0017  -0.0012 -0.0066 
1V/TIND 
(0.9610) (0.8676)  (0.8296)  (0.8979) (0.7880)  (0.8486) (0.3135) 
0.6350***  0.6035***  0.61099***   0.6016*** 0.6000***  0.5993***   0.6083*** 
Leverage 
(0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)   67
Table 9., continued   
            
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 0.0355   0.0193   0.0329   0.0355  0.0343   0.0370  -0.0486 
Dummy Foreigner 
(0.6168) (0.7886)  (0.6487)  (0.6210) (0.6281)  (0.6055) (0.5266) 
-0.0340 -0.0839  -0.0697  -0.0471  -0.0693  -0.0712 -0.1378  Dummy 
Government  (0.7610) (0.4622)  (0.5363)  (0.6769) (0.5332)  (0.5247) (0.2509) 
-0.0021 -0.0273  -0.0074    0.0057 -0.0126  -0.0075 -0.0738  Dummy 
Institutional  (0.9832) (0.7924)  (0.9424)  (0.9562) (0.9010)  (0.9414) (0.4726) 
 0.1826***  0.1824***   0.1799***   0.1846*** 0.1913***  0.1878***   0.1640*** 
Volatility 
(0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0005) 
-0.0425 -0.0583  -0.0499  -0.0560  -0.0534  -0.0552 -0.0452 
Growth 
(0.3830) (0.2362)  (0.3115)  (0.2529) (0.2716)  (0.2586) (0.3553) 
 0.6717**   0.7294**   0.7551**   0.7870** 0.7346**  0.7459**   0.7639** 
ROA 
(0.0309) (0.0198)  (0.0159)  (0.0123) (0.0178)  (0.0167) (0.0134) 
 0.0042   0.0217   0.0264   0.0209  0.0086   0.0178  -0.0155 
Size 
(0.8374) (0.2422)  (0.1433)  (0.2622) (0.6617)  (0.3418) (0.4622) 
63,642 59,313  58,738  59,591 63,200  60,739  53,889 
F-statistic 
(0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Adjusted R
2  0.2321 0.2174  0.2154  0.2184  0.2306 0.2223  0.2594 
              
Note: All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively, and p-values in parenthesis.   68
 
Table 10. Results from OLS Regressions of the Dividend Payout 
on Corporate Governance Measures for 2002 
Independent  Dependent Variable = Payout 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
-492,372 -401,497  -445,075 -511,422 -441,803 -411,779  -347,463  -377,839  Constant 
(0.0134)  (0.0467) (0.0231) (0.0091) (0.0296) (0.0489)  (0.0934)  (0.0699) 
0.1061 -0.5641  -0.4316  -0.4597  CGI 
(0.9027) 
           
(0.5410) (0.6353)  (0.6146) 
-12.4990*  -67,475 -100,914  1VIND    
(0.0878) 
      -6.5398 
(0.5628) 
-8.2664 
(0.4787)  (0.5575) (0.3906) 
-
14.4733**
-61,690 -61,099  -63,958  -29,114 
(0.0347)  (0.5885) (0.5926)  (0.5696)  (0.8024) 
1TIND       
  
  
           
0.7300*  0.5608 0.5746  0.6398  0.6402  1V/TIND          
(0.0608)  (0.2003) (0.1908)  (0.1399)  (0.1418) 
-18.2930*** -17.0541** Leverage                   
(0.0074) (0.0147) 
-47,246  Dummy 
Foreigner 
                    
(0.3413) 
-35,267  Dummy 
Government 
                    
(0.6595) 
-110,538  Dummy 
Institutional 
                    
(0.1168) 
-0.7289  -0.3153 -0.1066 -10,118 -0.4172  -0.7088  0.4701  0.4530  Volatility 
(0.8252)  (0.9226) (0.9737) (0.7542) (0.8979) (0.8295)  (0.8857)  (0.8900) 








34.4247*** 34.2450***  32.5916***
Total Assets  (0.0012)  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0011)  (0.0010)  (0.0025) 
0.4242  0.3219 0.4948 0.1596 0.1962  0.1857  -0.3639  -0.7478  Growth 









72.7963*** 67.2575***  70.9753*** ROA 
(0.0006)  (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010)  (0.0020)  (0.0016) 
3.5343*** 3.5636***  3.6994*** 3.5788*** 3.6092*** 3.9376***  4.1522***  4.5918***  Size 
(0.0087)  (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0036)  (0.0019)  (0.0010) 
80,586  86,603 89,844 87,863 69,409 61,926  64,777  51,931  F-statistic 
(0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Adjusted R2  0.1659  0.1775 0.1836 0.1799 0.1824  0.1799  0.2046  0.2038 
Note: All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively, and p-values in parenthesis. 
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Table 11. OLS Regressions of Tobin’s q and the Dividend Payout  
on Individual Items of the Corporate Governance Index for 2002 
        
   Tobin’s q  Dividend Payout 
Question  Alone  With other 
items  Alone  With other 
items 
0.2816*   0.2158  -18.7461*  -169,525 
1 
(0.0620)  (0.1673)  (0.0730)  (0.2116) 
0.0297   0.0572  -111,637  -126,829 
2 
(0.8148) (0.6746)  (0.1993)  (0.1285) 
0.0359   0.0291  66,198  81,206 
3 
(0.7688) (0.8185)  (0.4278)  (0.1828) 
0.0756   0.0151  -47,835  -73,493 
4 
(0.2873) (0.8492)  (0.3451)  (0.3596) 
0.2298***   0.1945**  13,279 15,336 
5 
(0.0027) (0.0179)  (0.8011) (0.2007) 
-0.0305 -0.0761  13,099 54,206 
6 
(0.6981) (0.3575)  (0.8068)  (0.7868) 
0.0932   0.0394  -63,358  -110,054 
7 
(0.1466) (0.5961)  (0.1525)  (0.3469) 
0.0266   0.0003  32,047   0.7778** 
8 
(0.7593) (0.9976)  (0.5910)  (0.0369) 
0.1190*   0.0723  61,157  110,703 
8 
(0.0571)  (0.3261) (0.1625) (0.9001) 
-0.1267** -0.1359** -58,492  -4.2860** 
10 
(0.0296) (0.0259)  (0.1414)  (0.0320) 
-0.0084 -0.0639  -52,828  -456,534 
11 
(0.8943) (0.3501)  (0.2220)  (0.3096) 
0.1760**   0.1118  10,466  16,216 
12 
(0.0422)  (0.2396) (0.8619) (0.3378) 
0.1225   0.1648  60,771  80,046 
13 
(0.3607) (0.3098)  (0.5116)  (0.8068) 
0.1099  -0.0965 61,323 -41,452 
14 
(0.6456) (0.7336)  (0.7079)  (0.4803) 
0.0172 -0.0298  -145,189  41,419 
15 
(0.9181) (0.8798)  (0.2169)  (0.8339)   70
Table 11., continued   
 
   Tobin’s q  Dividend Payout 
Question  Alone  With other 
items  Alone  With other 
items 
0.0585  -0.0526 72,419 -0.2092 
16 
(0.5836) (0.6444)  (0.3265)  (0.7637) 
-0.0158 -0.0226  -38,641  27,915 
17 
(0.8326) (0.7918)  (0.4484)  (0.9797) 
0.0469   0.1315  -99,579  -96,407 
18 
(0.6425) (0.2219)  (0.1476)  (0.6388) 
-0.1201 -0.2032  -17.3284**  -224,958 
19 
(0.3258) (0.1316)  (0.0374)  (0.1999) 
0.0173   0.0324  -47,630  -5.9470** 
20 
(0.8511) (0.7415)  (0.4555)  (0.0172) 
0.0579   0.0926  -47,823  -15,479 
21 
(0.4875) (0.3131)  (0.4145)  (0.3894) 
0.1749***   0.1537**  22,383 34,041 
22 
(0.0027) (0.0140)  (0.5812) (0.8117) 
0.0276 -0.0293  52,773  63,222 
23 
(0.6982) (0.6922)  (0.2749)  (0.4369) 
-0.1321*  -0.0919 17,943 28,669 
24 
(0.0910)  (0.2687) (0.7390) (0.2206) 
        
Note: All regressions include the control variables defined in the Appendix. Each question 
is show in Table 1  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively, and p-values in parenthesis.  
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Table 12. Results from OLS Regressions of the Price-to-Book Ratio 
on Corporate Governance Measures for 2002 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
-190,379 -188,438  -126,720 -191,134 -198,209 -184,175 -60,055 
Constant  (0.0452) (0.0488)  (0.2481) (0.0455) (0.0409)  (0.0653)  (0.6007)
16,730 
Disclosure  (0.1612) 





              
-16,826 
Conflicts 
     
(0.2524) 
           
 0.4581 
Sh. Rights 
        
(0.6679) 
        
 0.2411 
CGI 
           
(0.6083) 
     
CGI  0.0952 
Reduced 

























                 
(0.3264)
-63,787 -61,239  -115,332 -62,757  -54,190 -65,081  -71,478 
1VIND  (0.2813) (0.3037)  (0.1267) (0.2914) (0.3770)  (0.2915)  (0.3021)
 10.4145*  97,205   13.8773**  10.3062*  95,680 97,139   13.0025*
1TIND  (0.0870)  (0.1106)  (0.0500) (0.1000) (0.1160) (0.1109)  (0.0961)
 0.0387   0.0262   0.0693   0.0281   0.0209   0.0316  -0.0598 
1V/TIND  (0.8620) (0.9067)  (0.7586) (0.9001) (0.9257)  (0.8879)  (0.8022)
-0.0385 -0.6411  -0.4635 -0.7093 -0.6673  -0.4966  -0.6948 
Leverage  (0.9915) (0.8597)  (0.8976) (0.8450) (0.8536)  (0.8911)  (0.8485)
-18,722 -21,416  -24,314 -19,491 -20,041 -21,152  -39,794  Dummy 
Foreigner  (0.4640) (0.4067)  (0.3456) (0.4499) (0.4350)  (0.4118)  (0.1591)
-29,647 -383,199  -32,343 -34,118 -36,913 -36,002  -56,553  Dummy 
Government  (0.4621) (0.3494)  (0.4217) (0.4002) (0.3588)  (0.3715)  (0.2000)
-23,865 -27,235  -26,831 -23,439 -25,837 -25,650  -38,666  Dummy 
Institutional  (0.5132) (0.4646)  (0.4631) (0.5262) (0.4808)  (0.4842)  (0.3063)  72
Table 12., continued 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 10.0053***   9.9444***   9.8137***  9.9943***   10.0210***  9.8644***   9.5041***
Volatility  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
-18,147 -21,139  -22,905 -21,039 -20,677 -20,617  -23,361 
Growth  (0.3017) (0.2312)  (0.1938) (0.2314) (0.2389)  (0.2407)  (0.1939)
-22.3466** -20.7410* -20.9152* -20.0252* -20.6847* -20.5401* -20.0055*
ROA  (0.0461) (0.0641)  (0.0607) (0.0748) (0.0642)  (0.0661)  (0.0770)
 0.7164   1.1815*   1.2065*   1.1493*  10,684   1.2607*   0.3234 
Size  (0.3308)  (0.0765) (0.0615) (0.0859)  (0.1341)  (0.0628)  (0.6758)
48,998 46,960  48,294 47,086 47,170  46,927  36,942 
F-statistic  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Adjusted R
2  0.1801 0.1723  0.1775 0.1728 0.1732  0.1722  0.1770 
              
Note: All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively, and p-values in parenthesis. 
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Table 13. Results from OLS Regressions of Tobin’s q, Dividend Payout, 
and the Price-to-Book Ratio on Corporate Governance Measures for 2002 
 
   Tobin’s q  Dividend Payout  Price-to-Book 









(0.0021) (0.0409) (0.0429) 
0.0273** 
 0.0126*  -0.4597 























(0.7703) (0.1160) (0.1283) 
-0.0017 
-0.0030 





(0.0010)  (0.9257) (0.9375) 
























(0.1992) (0.3588) (0.3574) 
-0.0126 
 0.0263 






(0.0853)  (0.4808) (0.4723) 














(0.6442) (0.2389) (0.2395) 














(0.0000)  (0.1341) (0.1423) 





63,200 101,818  51,931  84,128  47,170  46,712 
F-statistic 
(0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Adjusted R
2  0.2306  0.3485 0.2038 0.3285  0.1732  0.1755 
Note: We treat observations as outliers, and drop them from the sample, if a studentized residual obtained by 
regressing the dependent variable on the CGI and a constant term exceeds ± 1.96. This method identifies 7 outliers 
for Tobin’s q, 16 for the dividend payout, and 6 for the price-to-book ratio. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, and p-values in 
parenthesis.  74
 
Table 14. Results from 3SLS Regressions of Tobin’s q and the Dividend Payout  
on Corporate Governance Measures for 2002 
 
Tobin’s q  Dividend Payout 
   CGI  q     CGI  PAYOUT 
52,102 -0.1596  -102,166  121,016 
Constant  (0.3853) (0.2976) Constant  (0.8204) (0.7725) 
208,764   0.7377 
q  (0.2114) 
  
PAYOUT  (0.6221) 
  
0.0401***  13,760 
CGI 
  
(0.0001)  CGI 
  
(0.6784) 
-14,760 0.0487  10,042 -14,634 
1VIND  (0.7201) (0.7607)  1VIND  (0.9332) (0.9259) 
-38,434 0.1838  49,815 -65,704 
1TIND  (0.4647) (0.2644)  1TIND  (0.6939) (0.5602) 
0.0473 -0.0021  -0.2138   0.3094 
1V/TIND  (0.7399) (0.7255) 1V/TIND  (0.7221) (0.4632) 
-123,519  0.5940***  144,805  -19.5771***
Leverage  (0.2506)  (0.0000)  Leverage  (0.6126)  (0.0039) 
-0.8465 0.0378  47,397 -61,001  Dummy 
Foreigner  (0.6354) (0.5912) 
Dummy 
Foreigner  (0.6469) (0.1974) 
15,020 -0.0724  86,724  -110,689  Dummy 
Government  (0.5345) (0.5158) 
Dummy 
Government (0.6066) (0.1381) 
0.2517 -0.0143  102,587  -13.7483**  Dummy 
Institutional  (0.9137) (0.8883) 
Dummy 
Institutional  (0.6239)  (0.0459) 
-42,123  0.1973***   0.2910  -0.2372 
Volatility  (0.1345)  (0.0000)  Volatility  (0.9268) (0.9501) 
11,147 -0.0533    0.6152 -0.8243 
Growth  (0.4089) (0.2587)  Growth  (0.8163) (0.7967) 
-149,528  0.7284**  -679,316   90.4811***
ROA  (0.3247)  (0.0147)  ROA  (0.6328)  (0.0000) 
0.5609***  0.0025  Size  -106,634   14.6172** 
Size Dummy  (0.0002)  (0.9858)  Dummy  (0.6759)  (0.0129) 
Adjusted R
2  0.0000 0.2269  Adjusted R
2  0.0000 0.1670 
 
Note: All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, and p-values in parenthesis.. Some non significant 
control variables omitted to save space.  





18.67% V & T 
94.94% V & 85.08% T
BB Price Fund
Banco do Brasil  Iberdrola
BB Livre Fund ADL Energy
521 Part. Brasilcap 
5.79% V & T 
19.42% V & T
7.40% V & T  19.58% V & T 
6.89% V & T 
20.85% V & T  1.40% V & T 
Figure 1. Two Examples of Ownership Structures: CELPE and Brasmotor 
Source: Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, Brazil, 2000. 
Note: The percentage of the voting capital is denoted by “V” and the percentage of the voting and non-voting capital by “T”.   76
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              Appendix: Variable Definitions  
 
Variable Definition 
1TDIR  Percentage of total capital (voting and non-voting) owned 
directly by the largest shareholder 
1TIND  Percentage of total capital (voting and non-voting) owned 
indirectly by the largest shareholder 
1V/TDIR  Ratio (wedge)of the percentage of voting capital to total 
capital owned directly by the largest shareholder  
1V/TIND  Ratio (wedge) of the percentage of voting capital to total 
capital owned indirectly by the largest shareholder 
1VDIR  Percentage of voting capital owned directly by the largest 
shareholder 
1VIND  Percentage of voting capital owned indirectly by the largest 
shareholder 
3TDIR  Percentage of total capital (voting and non-voting) owned 
directly by the three largest shareholders 
3TIND  Percentage of total capital (voting and non-voting) owned 
indirectly by the three largest shareholders 
3V/TDIR  Ratio (wedge) of the percentage of voting capital to total 
capital owned directly by the three largest shareholders 
3V/TIND  Ratio (wedge) of the percentage of voting capital to total 
capital owned indirectly by the three largest shareholders 
3VDIR  Percentage of voting capital owned directly by the three 
largest shareholders 
3VIND  Percentage of voting capital owned indirectly by the three 
largest shareholders 
5TDIR  Percentage of total capital (voting and non-voting) owned 
directly by the five largest shareholders 
5TIND  Percentage of total capital (voting and non-voting) owned 
indirectly by the five largest shareholders 
5V/TDIR  Ratio (wedge) of the percentage of voting capital to total 
capital owned directly by the five largest shareholders 
5V/TIND  Ratio (wedge) of the percentage of voting capital to total 
capital owned indirectly by the five largest shareholders 
5VDIR  Percentage of voting capital owned directly by the five largest 
shareholders 
5VIND  Percentage of voting capital owned indirectly by the five 
largest shareholders 
ADR  1 if firm has issued level 1, 2 or 3 American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs); 0 otherwise    78
Variable Definition 
AGR  Dummy indicating the presence of a shareholder agreement 
CA/TA  Ratio of currents assets to total assets at year-end.  
CGI  Corporate governance index, scaled to a value between 0 and 
24, taking into account 24 different aspects of the corporate 
governance structure of the company according to Table 1 
CGI Reduced  CGI without questions 4 and 5 in Table 1 which may be 
correlated to company size.  
FOR  Dummy indicating that the largest ultimate shareholder is a 
foreign investor 
FREE Percentage  of  outstanding  shares available for trading 
GOV  Dummy indicating that the largest ultimate shareholder is the 
Government 
Growth  Average annual growth of sales over the past 3 years ending 
on the day of measurement of Tobin’s q 
INST  Dummy indicating that the largest ultimate shareholder is an 
institutional investor 
Leverage  Ratio of total (non equity) liabilities to total assets at year-end
NM  1 if firm is listed in levels 1, 2 or Novo Mercado at the São 
Paulo Stock Exchange; 0 otherwise 
P/B  Market value of stock divided by book value of stock 
Payout  Cash and stock dividends/Net Income ratio with year-end 
values.  
P/S  Market value of equity divided by net sales 
P/CF  Market value of equity divided by EBITDA 
Prin 1   Principal component 1. Principal components extracted from 
the 24 questions that showed eigenvalues greater than 1 and 
that explained 5% or more of the questions variance.  After a 
Varimax rotation, this factor showed absolute correlation 
values greater than 50% with questions 17 (0.80), 18 (0.78), 
and 24 (-0.68) in Table 1. These have to do with the lesser use 
of non-voting shares to leverage control over cash-flow rights 
and the free-float (question 24). We called this factor “One 
share one vote”. It is reasonable that the free-float is 
negatively correlated with the factor because non-voting 
shares are the most liquid shares in Brazil. If they not used and 
control is concentrated, than the free-float is less.    79
 
Variable Definition 
Prin 2  Principal component 2. Same extraction criteria as Prin 1. 
After a Varimax rotation, this factor showed absolute 
correlation values greater than 50% with questions 7 (0.83) 
and 9 (0.74) in Table 1. These have to do with the board’s 
independence. We called this factor “Board Independence”. 
Prin 3  Principal component 3. Same extraction criteria as Prin 1. 
After a Varimax rotation, this factor showed absolute 
correlation values greater than 50% with questions 13 (0.85) 
and 14 (0.81) in Table 1. These have to do with being free of 
corporate governance mal practices inquiries and convictions. 
We called this factor “Mal Practices Free”. 
Prin 4  Principal component 4. Same extraction criteria as Prin 1. 
After a Varimax rotation, this factor showed absolute 
correlation values greater than 50% with questions 4 (0.50), 
10 (-0.63) and 12 (0.71) in Table 1. These have to do with 
using international accounting standards, board size, and 
presence of a fiscal board. Smaller companies tend to have 
smaller boards, no fiscal boards and no international 
accounting standards usage, thus the negative correlation of 
this question with this factor.  We called this factor 
“Disclosure Supervision”. 
Prin 5  Principal component 5. Same extraction criteria as Prin 1. 
After a Varimax rotation, this factor showed absolute 
correlation values greater than 50% with questions 11 (0.63), 
15 (0.57), and 21 (0.75) in Table 1. These have to do with 
board member terms, use of arbitration, and generous tag-
along rights. We called this factor “Shareholder rights 
enforcement”. 
Prin 6  Principal component 6. Same extraction criteria as Prin 1. 
After a Varimax rotation, this factor showed absolute 
correlation values greater than 50% with questions 1 (0.71), 5 
(0.61), and 22 (0.60) in Table 1. These have to do with 
disclosure of related party transactions, auditor quality, and 
pyramids. We called this factor “Related party transactions 
potential”. 
PYR  Dummy indicating the presence of a pyramid (indirect 
structure). LLS (1999) define a pyramid as when there is a 
public company in the control chain of another public 
company. We use the term more loosely and call any indirect 
control structure as a pyramid.    80
 
Variable Definition 
ROA  Ratio of operating income to total assets (return on assets) at 
year-end 
Size  Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of book value of 
total assets in thousands of Brazilian reais at year-end.  
Size dummy  Equal 1 if firm size is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. We 
also experimented with size dummies for the top decile, top 
third, and top half firm size in the sample. Firm size is defined 
as in “size” above.  
Tobin’s q  Ratio of market value to book value of assets. Market value of 
assets is computed as market value of equity plus book value 
of assets minus book value of equity at year-end values. The 
numerator “market value of equity” was computed directly by 
Economática as the most liquidity stock type (voting or non-
voting) market price times the total number of shares (voting 
and non-voting).  
Volatility Annualized  standard  deviation of daily Brazilian currency 
stock returns in the year ending on the day of measurement of 
Tobin’s q.  
VOTE  Percentage of voting capital to total capital  
  
 